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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER
and STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP,
Plaintif f s-Appellants,

Supreme Court No. 880207

vs
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION,
Def endant-Respondent,
Petitioner.

STATEMENT OPPOSING DIXIE'S QUESTIONS
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Dixie's questions for review in its brief do not
accurately state the case and do not present a situation
in which a writ of certiorari should be issued.

Rule 4 3

of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court state the character
of reasons that will be considered before granting a writ
of certiorari.

It is submitted that no such reasons are

presented by Dixie.

A copy of Rule H3 is included in the

appendix hereto.
I.

Dixie's first question is founded principally

on the argument that Scheller's remedy is contained in the
contract provision for dissolution of the partnership.

-2That argument is contrary to the trial court's judgment
which specifically states that the partnership "continues
in force."

A copy of the trial court's judgment, which

was prepared by Dixie, is included in the appendix.

There

has never been an issue as to partnership dissolution.
Because the partnership remains in existence, the Court
of Appeals properly determined that the contract between
Dixie and Scheller did not contemplate a situation where
Dixie would sell the unimproved property, and because there
was no applicable contract provision, the doctrine of quantum
meruit should be applied to determine any division of profits
after Dixie had already been reimbursed for its expenses
and received a sales commission of six percent.

The Court

of Appeals stated at 8l Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 30 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) that:
. . . In this case, while the parties entered
into a contract, no contract existed as to the
allocation of proceeds in the event the property
was sold undeveloped. . . .
A copy of the opinion of the Court of Appeals is included
in the appendix.
It is submitted that Dixie's position in its first
question does not accurately represent the facts or law,
and there is no conflict with previous decisions of the

-3Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals which would justify
issuing the writ under the circumstances of this case.
II.

Dixie's second question proposes that Scheller

was estopped or had waived her right to object to the allocation of proceeds from the sale of the undeveloped property.
Dixie does not cite any conflicting decision or other reason
for issuance of the writ under Rule 43.
III.

Dixie's third question asks that this court

review the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the meaning
of the words "subdivide, develop and market" repeatedly
used in the contract.

Dixie cites no case in conflict with

the Court of Appeals' right to interpret the meaning of
the words in the contract as a matter of law in a situation
where the trial court did not make any determination of
fact concerning the intent of the parties as to those words
at the time the contract was made.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dixie and Scheller entered into a written contract
in which several separate provisions required Dixie to "subdivide, develop and market" the property contributed by
Scheller.

Although those words were not defined in the

contract, they were taken from Dixie's own agreement from
a prior transaction.

Dixie constructed no improvements

on the property and sold the unimproved property to Busch.
Dixie was reimbursed for all of its expenses plus a sales
commission of six percent of the total sales price. The
issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial
court had properly determined that after payment of the
expenses and commission Dixie should also share in the sale
profits as though Dixie had constructed improvements on
the property.

The Court of Appeals held that the contract

did not contemplate a situation where Dixie did not build
improvements on the property and therefore the doctrine
of quantum meruit should be applied.

The Court of Appeals

also held that Scheller could not be estopped to object
to the division of proceeds even though Scheller had agreed
to a sale because Dixie had the independent power to sell
the property under the contract without Schellerfs permission.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
It is submitted that the following facts apply
to the questions stated in Dixie's petition.
1.

The Dixie-Scheller contract does not define

the words "subdivide, develop and market".

A copy of the

contract (Trial Exhibit 5) is included in the appendix.
2.

Those words or substantial equivalents thereof

are used nine times throughout the contract.
II, VI, IX, XIV and XV.

See Articles

-53.

T h e w^^-'i? '"subdivide, H P V ^ I ^ :

and t h e context ine -

» •

*

sr.n miv ret '
- *v-1 m

-

from D i x i e ' s o w n c o n t r a c t from a p r i o r t r a n s a c t i o n w h i c h
c o n t r a c t w a s used a s a m o d e l f o r t h e Dixie-Schelle-" 1 r o n * r & ~ t .
A copy of D i x i e ' s c o n t r a c t (Trial Exhit :i t

J!

I) j s i

in the appendix.
^ . T) ie tr:i a 1 coI irt i i Iacie :i io d e t e r m i n a t i o n oi t h e
parties' frre't as to •.!-- vi^ai . nf * * : h ^?° w^rd? »^ f^e
See Findings el Yhr:X &^-i Conclusions

time the contract was made.

5.

Under the contract Dixie had • h- power to

sell the property and also had the obligation to obtain
f i n a n c i n g a n d t o i ^ U J I v i d e , (J«.- vt- J oj> H i nmik^t"" thf p r o p e r t y .
F( r e x a m p l e j :r r e g a r d t o D i x i e ' s o b l i g a t i o n , ArticI e XIV
•r rig sentence which was taken verbatim

•' ". ".^-^ • r '

from paragraph [\ of 1)1 xie's prior contract:
It j s understood by the parties that the
property shall be utilized by the partnership
to obtain a loan, the proceeds thereof to be used
for
the subdivision, development and marketing
~4 ^ K e property by Dixie,
Shortly after the contract was signed in 1980
and

then again

id

tin

property appraised.
the same value.

l,ill

ul

I oft?

Mi>ie h -

•••

- ^r— )ved

Both appraisals showea suL-stantiai .
-v

(Trial Exhibits 8 and 3^; also see R. 212-13)-

-67.

Dixie told Scheller in early 1983 that in

addition to reimbursement for expenses and receiving a six
percent sales commission, Dixie was also entitled to fifty
percent of the profit on any sale whether or not the property
was sold without development thereon.

(Trial Exhibit 14;

R. 294-95).
8.

Also in early 1983 and prior to the sale of

the unimproved property to Busch, Scheller objected orally
and in writing to the proposed allocation to Dixie of any
expected sales proceeds above the reimbursement and commission.
(Trial Exhibit 15; R. 295-96).
9.

Thereafter, on June 30, 1983 Dixie sold the

unimproved property to Busch.
10.

(Trial Exhibit 16).

Although Dixie now argues that Scheller is

limited to remedies for dissolution or breach of contract,
the trial court's judgment (prepared by Dixie) specifically
states that the partnership between Dixie and Scheller continues.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. WHERE THE CONTRACT GAVE DIXIE THE
SEPARATE POWER TO SELL THE PROPERTY UNDEVELOPED
WHICH POWER DIXIE CHOSE TO EXERCISE IN SPITE OF
DIXIE'S SEPARATE CONTRACT OBLIGATION TO SUBDIVIDE,
DEVELOP AND MARKET THE PROPERTY, THE CONTRACT
DID NOT CONTEMPLATE THE OCCURRENCE OP SUCH A
SITUATION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED
QUANTUM MERUIT.

-7There was never an issue as to dissolution or
that Dixie breached the contract by exercising its power
to sell the undeveloped property.

Neither the trial court's

nor the Court of Appeals1 decision mentions any issue of
dissolution or breach.

For the first time Dixie now argues

that Scheller is limited to specific remedies for
dissolution or breach of contract which arguments are contrary
to the trial court's judgment that "the limited partnership
between the parties continues in force under its specific
terms."
The problem occurs since Dixie had the separate
contract obligation to build on the property the fulfillment
of which obligation was in substance a condition precedent
which needed to be performed before Dixie could share in
profits of sale.

Because Dixie chose not to build on the

property but to sell it unimproved, Dixie was not entitled
to share in the so-called profits as though Dixie had built
on the property.

The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted

the contract to provide first for reimbursement of expenses
and payment of the commission to Dixie and then for a division
of profits only if Dixie performed its contract obligation
to subdivide, develop and market.

The court held that there

was no provision in the contract providing for such allocation
of profits to Dixie if Dixie sold the property unimproved.

-8Thus, there was no written contract covering that circumstance, and the application of quantum meruit was proper.
None of the cases relied on by Dixie dealt with
the situation present in this case.

In Mann v. American

Western Life Insurance Co., 586 P.2d 46l (Utah 1978), the
issue

was whether there was an oral modification of a

written contract and not whether the written contract did
not contemplate a particular situation which later occurred.
In Jaye Smith Construction Co. v. Board of Education,
Granite School District, 560 P.2d 320 (UT 1977), the issue
was whether a separate letter was a limiting condition to
an unequivocal construction bid and not whether the bid
did not contemplate a later circumstance that was unanticipated.
In Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 6l8 P.2d 497 (UT 1980),
the contract specifically covered the fact situation therein
and did not deal with an eventuality not anticipated or
covered by the contract such as is present in this case.
Dixie implies that the Court of Appeals1 holding
in this case is contrary to the prior Court of Appeals1
decision in Davies v. Olson, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 746 P.2d
264 (UT Ct. App. 1987).

The same panel of the Court of

Appeals which decided the Davies case decided this case
only five months later and cited the Davies opinion.

In

-9Davies the panel discussed the doctrine of quantum meruit
at length but did not restrict its application to a situation
where a written contract exists but is silent as to an uncontemplated circumstance which occurs thereafter.

In this

case the parties obviously anticipated that subdividing,
developing and marketing was a condition precedent to the
payment to Dixie of fifty percent of the profits. Thus,
there was no contemplation that Dixie would claim that profit
without improving the property and there was no written
provision applying to such a circumstance.

The Court of

Appeals correctly applied quantum meruit to that situation
where the contract did not expressly cover the uncontemplated
circumstance that later occurred.
POINT II. BECAUSE DIXIE HAD THE RIGHT TO SELL
THE PROPERTY, NEITHER SCHELLERTS CONSENT NOR LACK
OF OBJECTION TO A SALE CAN BE THE BASIS FOR ESTOPPEL.
Dixie's argument is based on several assertions
which are demonstrably wrong.

First of all, Scheller objected

to Dixie's proposed allocation of profits both orally and
in writing before the sale to Busch.

Secondly, Scheller

has never pleaded or argued that Dixie breached the contract.
Schellerfs consistent position has been that the contract
provided that Dixie was entitled to be reimbursed for its
expenses plus a commission but the contract did not provide

-10that Dixie was entitled to take an additional fifty percent
if Dixie did not go forward and subdivide, develop and market
the property.
POINT III. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD
THAT THE TRIAL COURT WRONGLY DECIDED THE CASE ON THE
BASIS OF ESTOPPEL AND THEN FAILED TO GO FURTHER AND
DEFINE THE PIVOTAL WORDS "SUBDIVIDE, DEVELOP AND
MARKET."
Contrary to the assertion in Dixie's third point
that the Court of Appeals wrongly substituted its judgment
on the facts for that of the trial court's, the trial court
never defined the words "subdivide, develop and market"
in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
and never determined the parties1 intention as to the meaning
of those words at the time the contract was executed.

It

is clear that the words "subdivide, develop and market"
come from Dixie's prior agreement and should have been
construed against Dixie.

Dixie again asserts in its third

point that Scheller's remedy is one for breach.

That assertion

has no merit as Dixie well knows because the partnership
was specifically held by the trial court to continue in
existence.
CONCLUSION
Dixie does not present a reason under Rule 43
that justifies granting a writ of certiorari.

There was

-11never an issue as to remedies for breach of contract or
dissolution, and the trial court specifically held that
the partnership continued.

The contract did not contemplate

a situation where Dixie would sell the property undeveloped
and then also share in the profit even though Dixie had
not fulfilled its obligation to subdivide, develop and market
the property.

The Court of Appeals properly applied quantum

meruit where the contract did not contain a remedy for that
circumstance.

DixieTs petition should be denied.

DATED this IjJth day of June, 1988.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailedf our copies of the foregoing to CRAIG G. ADAMSON and MARK A. LARSEN, attorneys for
petitioner, 310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City,
UT 84101, postage prepaid, this l#th day of June, 1988.
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THIRD DISTRICT
I Honorable Dean E. Conder
1 ATTORNEYS:
Walter P. Faber, Jr. for Appellants.
I Craig G. Adamson, Mark A. Larsen,
| Lawrence k. Huriess for Respondent.
J

OPINION

ORME, Jadge:
Appellants Scheller and Tollstnip appeal
from a judgment awarding defendant Dixie
Six Corporation what they contend is an excessive distribution pursuant to a limited partnership agreement between the parties. We
reverse in part and remand.
Facts

Cite i s

SI Utah Adv. Rep. 27
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Vivian M. SCHELLER and Steven D.
Tollstnip, '
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Billings, Garfft and Orme.
No. S60147-CA
FILED: April 25,19S*

Vivian Scheller and her son Steven Tollstnip
("Scheller*), owned approximately twentyfour acres of property in Salt Lake County
which they intended to have developed to
produce long-term income. In the spring of
1979, Mrs. Scheller approached Hal Larsen,
an officer of Dixie Six Corporation, about
working with her and her son to develop the
property. On March 3, 1980, the parties
formed a limited partnership known as
D.S.T., Ltd., with Dixie Six as the general
partner and Mrs. Scheller and her son as
limited partners. Pursuant to the limited partnership agreement, Dixie Six contributed
SI0,000 toward the initial capital and Scheller
conveyed the property to D.S.T.
The partnership agreement provided that the
purpose of the partnership was to "subdivide,
develop and market" the property. The words
•subdivide, develop and market" were left
undefined. The agreement contained a formula
for the allocation of the partnership's receipts,
which may be summarized as follows:
(a) First, to reimburse the actual
expenses relative to the subdividing,
development, improvement and tale
of the property,
(b) Second, to payment to the
Limited Partners for the real property, calculated at $30,000 per
acre.
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder to Dixie Six and one-half of
the remainder to the Limited Partners.
In addition, the agreement provided that Dixie
Six could charge the partnership a real estate
commission not exceeding &k of the sales
price of the property and, further, that Dixie
Six had the unqualified right to sell the property at any time.
Following the signing of the agreement,
Dixie Six hired Western Design, which began
preparing plans, plats, and studies, and sought

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

_

Scheller ?. DWe Six Corporation
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Frovo, Utah
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II Utah Adv. Rep. 27
governmental approval to build an apartment the obligation to 'subdivide, develop and
and commercial complex on the site.
market" the property. Thus, Dixie Six's right
In April 1981, D.S.T. sold 1.2 acres of the to share in the proceeds according to the
property to Marvin Hendrickson, an officer formula set forth in the agreement was contiand shareholder in Dixie Six, for $36,000.00 ngent upon its fulfilling its obligation to
and in February 1982, D.S.T. sold an additi- "subdivide, develop and market" the property.
onal 0.75 acres to Hendrickson. In both traThe trial court did not reach the issue of the
nsactions, D.S.T. took no sales commission or meaning of the term "develop" as used in the
other distribution and paid all of the proceeds agreement because it determined that Scheller
toScheller.
was "estopped" from taking the position that
Once the plans for improvement on the site Dixie Six had not performed as provided in
were completed in the fall of 1982, Dixie Six the contract. We find Scheller's conduct does
attempted to get financing for the project but not constitute estoppel.
was unsuccessful.1 During this time, D.S.T.
Estoppel
received an offer from P.F. West to purchase
The elements of estoppel are: 'conduct by
the remaining property. Dixie Six sought
Scheller's consent to the proposed sale to P.F. one party which leads another party, in reliWest and Scheller consented, but the sale was ance thereon, to adopt a course of action
never completed. Dixie Six subsequently disc- resulting in detriment or damage if the first
ontinued its efforts to locate and obtain fina- party is permitted to repudiate his conduct."
ncing. Dixie Six then caused the remaining Barnes v. Wood, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 62, 64
partnership property to be sold to Busch (Ct. Xpp. 1988) (quoting Blackhurst v. TrailDevelopment on June 30, 1983, for a sum in samerica IDS. CO., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah
1985)). The trial court concluded that appellexcess of SI .2 million.
ants were estopped from asserting that Dixie
Prior to the sale of the property, Dixie Six
Six could not sell the property unless it was
informed Scheller that it intended to divide the
"developed" because Scheller had knowledge
proceeds from the sale according to the
of, acquiesced in, and approved of the two
formula set forth in the partnership agreeminor sales of property to Marvin Hendricment.2 Scheller objected to allocation of the
kson and the proposed sale to P.F. West, all
proceeds on that basis. The sale was concluded
without any development having taken place.
without the allocation issue having been resHowever, the trial court's conclusion confuses
olved. On September 23, 1983 Scheller filed
Scheller's position concerning sale of the
suit in district court seeking a declaratory
property with Scheller's position concerning
judgment limiting Dixie Six to the recovery of
the allocation of proceeds upon sale.
its expenses plus the 6% sales commission for
Scheller has not asserted that Dixie Six
the sale of the property and to prohibit Dixie
Six from sharing in the profit of the sale as set could not sell the property unless it was
"developed * as anticipated under the agreeforth in the partnership agreement.
ment
but only that Dixie Six was not entitled
The trial court found that the partnership
agreement did not define the* words to a full share of the proceeds for the sale of
'subdivide, develop, and market" and concl- property unless it satisfied its obligations
uded that Dixie Six did not violate the agree- under the contract. Scheller's approval of the
ment by selling the property. The court also first two sales of property do not constitute an
concluded that Scheller was estopped from estoppel from objecting to the allocation of
claiming that Dixie Six had not performed in proceeds from the Busch sale for two reasons.
accordance with the contract because Scheller First, the earlier sales of property, combined,
had knowledge of, and in fact acquiesced and constituted only 1.95 acres out of the total 24
approved of, all sales of the property. In acres owned by D.S.T. and involved land that
addition, the court found that it would be was never intended for development. Second,
inequitable to allow Scheller to accept the Dixie Six took no sales commissions on these
efforts of Dixie Six without allowing Dixie Six transactions and paid all the proceeds to
to recover as provided in the contract. Since Scheller. Therefore, Scheller had no reason to
the parties had expressly provided no altern- complain about the allocation of proceeds.
Nor can Scheller's approval of the proposed
ative method of compensating Dixie Six for its
services, the court found the formula as set P.F. West sale form the basis of an estoppel
forth in the partnership agreement to be enf- from objecting to the allocation of proceeds
from the Busch sale. The P.F. West sale was
orceable.
never completed and there were no proceeds to
Scheller argues that Dixie Six was not entiallocate. Thus, Scheller's failure to object to
tled to a full share of the profits from the sale
the allocation of proceeds from two sales in
of the property because It sold the property
which Dixie Six took no proceeds and one
without •developing" it as required by the
proposed sale which never reached the point
agreement. Scheller acknowledges that, while
of allocation, is not conduct that could reasDixie Six had the unqualified right to sell the
onably lead Dixie Six to believe that Scheller
property at any time, a right Scheller contends
J would not object to its claiming a full share of
was given primarily for tax purposes, it had
REPORTS
UTAH ADVAN

CODE• CO
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proceeds in the event of a consummated sale perty. However, even if there is some ambigof undeveloped property. Any uncertainty in uity concerning what the parties intended
this regard was resolved when, nearly two when using the term "develop," the evidence
months prior to closing of the Busch sale, compels the conclusion that the parties inteScheiler's counsel wrote Dixie Six objecting to nded to mean "build." The formula allocating
use of the agreement's formula for allocating a full 5 0 * of the net proceeds to Dixie Six is
sale proceeds if the property were sold unde- itself indicative of that result. If all Scheller
•anticipated was the sale of the property, it
veloped.
We hold that the trial court erred in concl- would have hired a real estate agent and paid
uding that Scheller was estopped by its own the standard real estate commission. Common
actions from asserting that Dixie Six did not sense dictates that one does not offer someone
perform as provided in the contract. Because half of the net profit on the sale of property
the trial court decided the case on a theory of for simply serving as an agent to sell property.
More importantly, the prior discussions and
estoppel, it was not necessary for it to reach
what we view as the pivotal issue in this case, negotiations between the parties and their
namely the meaning of the term 'develop9 as course of conduct assumed actual building on
used in the agreement. Since we find that the property. The trial court found that Dixie
Scheller's conduct did not give rise to an est- Six sought government approval for "the
oppel, the exact meaning of the term is crit- building of an apartment and commercial
complex on the site." The court also found
ical.
that prior to forming the partnership, the
'Subdivide, Develop and Market*
parties met on the site of the property and
Generally, the term "develop/ when used in "discussed possible types and configurations of
connection with real estate, is interpreted to buildings which might fit on the land."
mean "the converting of a tract of land into
The parties' agreement contemplated the
an area suitable for residential or business development of the property and did not
uses/ Prince George's County v. Equitable anticipate the sale of the property undevelTrust Co., Inc., 44 Md. App. 272, 408 A.2d oped. Accordingly, the payment formula was
737, 742 (1979). Accord, Muirhead v. PUot premised on the sale of developed property.
Properties, Inc., 258 So.2d 232, 233 (Miss. So certain were the parties that the property
1972). Similarly, the word "developer," in would be developed that they never contempcommon parlance, means "a person who lated a formula for the allocation of proceeds
develops real estate; often: one that improves
in the event of a sale of undeveloped property.
and subdivides land and builds and sells residential structures thereon/ Webster's Third Thus, there was simply no agreement between
the parties as to the allocation of proceeds in
New International Dictionary 618 (1986).
the event that Dixie Six failed to develop the
The parties' agreement states in Article II property as required by the agreement.
that the purpose of the partnership is to
Absent a meeting of the minds on how to
"subdivide, develop, and market" the prop- divide the proceeds in the event of sale
erty. The use of these terms, or some varia- without development, Dixie Six has no clear
tion, throughout the agreement, is consistent contractual right to recover anything in excess
with the interpretation that "develop" means of the agreed commission and expense reimto build. For example, Article VI, with our bursement. Nonetheless, Scheller concedes that
emphasis, states as follows:
Dixie Six may be entitled to some sort of
In addition thereto, Dixie shall
equitable remedy.
contribute its expertise for the
Quantum Meruit
purpose of subdividing, developing
The
trial
court,
considering it had no alterand marketing the property; shall
native method of compensation, determined it
provide or obtain all equipment,
had to either award Dixie Six no additional
machinery and personnel necessary
compensation whatsoever or a full 50* of the
for such subdivision, development
profit from the sale of the property. It chose
and marketing; and shall obtain the
the latter rather than leave Dixie Six uncomnecessary and sufficient financing
pensated for its efforts. While we agree with
tot such subdivision, development
the trial court that it would be unfair to allow
and marketing, using the property
Scheller to profit from the work done by Dixie
as security thereof.
Viewing the contract as a whole, we would Six in anticipation of development, we do not
have little difficulty in concluding, as a matter agree that the only alternative is to give Dixie
of law, that the term "develop" as used in this Six a 50% share of the net proceeds from the
agreement means "build/ 3 Equipment, mac- sale.
When a party, for some reason, is not enthinery, and secured lending suggest construction, not the mere planning, surveying, stud- itled by the express terms of a contract to
ying, and appraising which Dixie Six contends recover payment for services rendered, he or
satisfied the obligation to "develop" the pro- she might nonetheless be entitled to recover in
quantum meruit. DaWes v. Olson, 746 P.2d
UTAH ADVANCE RETORTS
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264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Recovery
under quantum meruit presupposes that no
enforceable contract exists. Id. In this case,
while the parties entered into a contract, no
contract existed as to the allocation of proceeds in the event the property was told undeveloped.
Quantum meruit has two distinct branches,
both rooted in justice to prevent one party's
enrichment at the other's expense. Id. at 269.
The first branch, contract implied in law or
'quasi-contract/ is really not a contract at
all, but rather an action in restitution. Id.
'The dements of a quasi-contract, or a
contract implied in law are: (1) the defendant
received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or
knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3)
under circumstances that would make it unjust
for the defendant to retain the benefit without
paying for i t / Id. Recovery under quasicontract or contract implied in law is measured by the value of the benefit conferred on
the defendant and not by the detriment incurred by the plaintiff or, necessarily, the reasonable value of the plaintiffs services. Id.
The second branch of quantum meruit,
contract implied in fact, is an actual contract
esublished by conduct. Id. The elemenu of a
contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant
requested the plaintiff to perform the work;
(2) the plaintiff expected the defendant to
compensate him or her for those services; and
(3) the defendant knew or should have known
that the plaintiff expected compensation. Id.
Recovery in such cases is for the amount the
parties can be said to have reasonably intended as the contract price. When the parties
have left that amount unexpressed, courts will
infer the amount to be the reasonable value of
the plaintiffs services. Id.
The conduct of the parties in this case established a contract implied in fact as to the
allocation of proceeds if the property was told
prior to development. Scheller requested Dixie
Six to perform the work of developing the
property which necessarily involved the work
of preparing plans, plats, and studies and
securing governmental approval for construction on the site. Likewise, Dixie Six dearly
expected to be compensated for these services.
Finally, Scheller knew or should have known
that Dixie Six expected compensation for these
services beyond the 6tt sales commission it
would recrive for just selling the property.
It is reasonably dear that, in agreeing to the
payment formula prescribed in the agreement,
the parties contemplated that Dixie Six's 6V§
commission, a standard commission rate in the
real estate industry, would compensate it for
its efforts in marketing the property while the
5 0 * share in the net profits would reward it
for its efforts in subdividing and developing
the property. Thus, if there had been a mere
tale, 6 * of the selling price would represent
an appropriate allocation to Dixie Six.

However, while it cannot be said that Dixie
Six satisfied its obligation to develop the
property, the trial court nonetheless found
that Dixie Six had expended efforts which
enhanced the property, induding acquiring
plans for development of the property and
obtaining governmental approval for development in accordance with the plans. As explained above, Dixie Six is entitled to a recovery
in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of
its non-sale efforts.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
insofar as it awards Dixie Six the reimbursement of its expenses and a sale commission of
6 * . The judgment is reversed insofar as it
also allowed Dixie Six 5 0 * of the net sale
profits, with remand for a determination of
the amount of additional compensation to
which Dixie Six is entitled under a theory of
quantum meruit. The parties shall bear their
own costs of appeal.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1. Articles IV and XIV of the agreement required
Dixie Six, as one of its obligations, to obtain financing.
2. In their complaint, Scheller also claimed that
Dixie Six had demanded a commission of 19tt
rather than the 6 * provided in the agreement.
5. Assuming that 'develop* means 'build/ uncertainty remains as to what was to be built: a church, a
race track, homes, a laundromat, or even roadways,
curbs, and gutters? Such uncertainty is inconsequential in adjudicating the parties' rights where
nothing whatever was built.
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Ron DA VIES and Dan Mehr, dba
Davies & Mehr Construction,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Timothy R. OLSON, William S. Lund,
Wasatch Bank, Utah Valley Bank, and
Household Finance Corporation, Defendants and Appellants.
Ron DAVIES and Dan Mehr, dba
Davies & Mehr Construction,
PlainttfTs and Appellants,
v.
Timothy R OLSON, William S. Lund,
Wasatch Bank, Utah Valley Bank, and
Household Finance Corporation, Defendants and Respondents.
Not. 86014S-CA, 860146-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 24, 1987.
Construction company brought action
against owners seeking recovery for services in constructing duplexes. The Fourth
District Court, Utah County, Robert J.
Bullock, J., found in favor of construction
company, and both parties appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that (1)
there was no enforceable written or oral
contract absent meeting of minds as to
contract price; (2) owners were not denied
due process due to fact that judgment was
based on quantum meruit, theory which
was not pled; and (3) statutory interest
was calculable from date on which owner
signed settlement statement used for closing on financing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.
1. Contracts *»28(3)
Finding that there was no enforceable
written or oral contract between owner and
contractor was supported by evidence that
parties did not agree on contract price and
that contractor never signed proposed contract

2. Accord and Satisfaction *»4
Settlement statement fixing sale under
construction contract which was used for
closing on financing did not constitute "executory accord," because there was no
meeting of the minds.
3. Trial *»6(1)
Hearing in civil action must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs parties of specific issues they must
be prepared to meet
4. Pleading *»427
Issues not expressly raised in pleadings may be tried by implied consent of
parties.
5. Constitutional Law *»310
Proof of quasi-contract under allegation of breach of express contract does not
violate due process, absent surprise or prejudice. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
6. Constitutional Law «=*310
Pleading *»427
Defendants in breach of contract action were not denied due process due to
trial court's award of damages based on
unpled theory of quantum meruit, where
supplemental hearing focused on plans and
specifications underlying cost breakdown
under construction contract, and on additional costs plaintiffs incurred because of
defendant's requested changes in specifications. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
7. Appeal and Error *»1H8(6)
In contractor's action to recover for
costs incurred in constructing duplexes,
judgment which awarded contractor damages based on theory of quantum meruit,
but which gave owner credit for prior judgment based on initial cost breakdown was
inconsistent, and required remand for determination of damages under quantum
meruit
8. Implied and Constructive Contracts
Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or
oral contract exists.

DA VIES v. OLSON
Cite • • 746 FJd J64 (UuhApp. I9S7)

9. Implied and Constructive Contracts
Elements of "quasi-contract," or contract implied in law, are: defendant received benefit; appreciation or knowledge
by defendant of benefit; under circumstances that would make it unjust for defendant to retain benefit without paying
for it
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

10. Implied and Constructive Contracts
«=*110
Measure of recovery under quasi-contract, or contract implied in law, is value of
benefit conferred on defendant, and not
detriment incurred by plaintiff, or necessarily reasonable value of plaintiffs services.
11. Contracts «»27
Elements of "contract implied in fact"
are: defendant requested plaintiff to perform work; plaintiff expected defendant to
compensate him or her for those services;
and defendant knew or should have known
that plaintiff expected compensation.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

12. Interest e»37(l)
Statutory legal rate of interest is applied from date payment is due to judgment date. U.C.A. 1953, 16-1-1.
13. Interest *»39(2.30)
Day on which settlement statement
was signed which was used at closing on
financing for construction project was day
that owner acknowledged obligation to pay
contractor for services in constructing duplexes, and determination of interest due
thus began on that date. U.C.A. 1953,
15-1- 1.
Dallas H. Young, Jr., Jerry L Reynolds,
Provo, for defendants and appellants.
Gary D. Stott, Lynn S. Davies, Salt Lake
City, for defendants and respondents.
1. The first trial was held on August 2, 19S2 and
September 13, 1982. The supplemental hearing
was held on April 4, 1985, April 10, 1985, and
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Before GARFF, ORME and
BILLINGS, JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Both parties appeal from the trial court's
May 17, 1985 judgment against defendant
Olson, purporting to award plaintiffs their
reasonable costs (plus interest) incurred in
constructing four duplexes for defendants.
We affirm the trial court's finding that
there was no contract, and the court's conclusion that quantum meruit was, therefore, the proper theory of recovery. We,
however, reverse the finding of no liability
on the part of defendant Lund. We remand for findings as to whether he (1)
requested plaintiffs to perform work and if
so, to what extent, and/or (2) received any
benefits as a result of plaintiffs' construction of the duplexes, and an entry of a
judgment consistent with those findings
and our opinion. We further reverse the
trial court's calculation of damages against
defendant Olson and remand for a determination of the reasonable value of plaintiffs'
services in constructing the duplexes, and
an entry of a judgment in that amount
against defendant Olson.
FACTS
The following facts were developed in a
bifurcated trial held on five nonconsecutive
days over a two-year eight-month period.1
Plaintiff Davies and defendant Olson orally
agreed that Davies would construct four
duplexes for Olson. The parties originally
agreed that plaintiff Davies would construct the duplexes for "cost plus $6,000
builder's profit per duplex.9' Based on this
oral agreement, plaintiff Davies prepared a
cost breakdown and submitted it to Wasatch Bank for acquisition of long-term financing, and to defendant Olson. Subsequently, defendant Olson requested numerous changes and additions to the original
specifications for the duplexes.
Soon thereafter, defendants, in an attempt to establish a ceiling price on the
April 16, 1985. The confusion and inconsistencies in the judgment are largely attributable to
the unfortunate interruptions in the trial.
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cost of construction at $72,070 per duplex,
prepared a contract and submitted it to
plaintiffs. In his letter to plaintiffs, defendant Olson stated that the purpose of
the proposed contract was "mainly to satisfy [defendant] Lund" as he was concerned
about fixing a ceiling price. This contract,
however, was never executed.
A settlement statement, dated July 7,
1981 and signed by defendant Lund, fixed
the contract sales price at $128,500. This
settlement statement was used at the closing with Wasatch Bank. Wasatch Bank
provided permanent financing, which was
insufficient to cover plaintiffs' construction
expenses. Consequently, plaintiffs initiated an action against, among others, defendants Olson and Lund, alleging claims
of fraud, breach of contract, and foreclosure of mechanics' liens. (The foreclosure claim was resolved).
After the initial trial on August 2, 1982
and September 13, 1982, the trial court
entered judgment on August 4, 1983
against defendants Lund and Olson for
$23,741.54f plus 12% interest accruing
from July 7, 1981. The court found there
was no agreement among the parties as to
the total price to be paid for the construction of the duplexes. The court, however,
based on the initial cost breakdown prepared by plaintiff Davies, found defendants
jointly liable for $23,741.54. The court
then found that plaintiffs were additionally
entitled to recover from defendant Olson
the reasonable costs incurred because of
defendant Olson's requested changes in the
duplex specifications.1 The court then directed counsel to negotiate and submit a
figure as to the reasonable costs plaintiffs
incurred because of defendant Olson's requested changes. The parties failed to
reach an agreement Consequently, a supplemental hearing was held on April 4,
1985, April 10, 1985, and April 16, 1985,
2. The court found the cost per duplex to be
$78,395. Multiplying that figure by the number
of duplexes built (4), and subtracting the construction costs paid by defendants, $289,838.46,
yielded s judgment in the amount of $23,741.54.
3. The court did not enter Judgment against defendant Lund for this additional recovery, find-

focusing on the following issues previously
reserved by the trial court
1. What were the plans and specifications upon which plaintiffs and defendants relied in the cost breakdown?
2. What modifications were subsequently made to those plans and specifications upon defendant Olson's requests?
3. What were the reasonable costs of
the requested modifications which
were actually made by plaintiffs?
The trial court, in its final judgment of
May 17, 1985, found there was no meeting
of the minds between the parties "as to
plans and specifications which formed the
basis of the cost breakdown," and, therefore, that it erred in basing its August 4,
1983 judgment on that document The
court concluded that in order to prevent
unjust enrichment of defendant Olson,
plaintiffs were entitled to recover their reasonable costs of construction from him.
The court, however, was silent as to defendant Lund's liability. The court awarded plaintiffs $51,773.96 plus interest "at
the legal rate of interest," accruing from
July 7,1981, the date the settlement statement was executed. The trial court calculated the May 17, 1985 judgment as follows:
Reasonable eoet of construction
$866,708.96
Lett adjustment for water roetert 1,850.00
NET CONSTRUCTION COST
866,868.96
Lett the Amount of the August 4
Judgment 4
818.6S0.00
Mty 17, 1986 Judgment to Plsintiffi $61,778.96

Both parties appeal from the Hay 17,1985
judgment
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
[1] On appeal, we are asked to deter
mine whether there is sufficient evidence
to support the trial court's finding of no
enforceable written or oral contract The
ing that defendant Lund merely assisted defendant Olson in acquiring long-term financing.
4. The court credited defendant Olson with payment of $78,395 per duplex, multiplied by the
number of duplexes built (4), or $313,580. Sit
Note 2, supra.
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trial court's findings of fact will not be set
aside unless "clearly erroneous." Utah
R.O.P. 62(a); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d
815 (Utah CtApp.1987); State v. Walker,
748 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). A review of
the record amply supports the trial court's
findings (1) that there was no meeting of
the minds as to the contract price, an essential term of a construction contract; (2)
that there was no meeting of the minds as
to which plans and specifications formed
the basis of the cost breakdown prepared
by plaintiff Davies; and (3) that the parties
did not intend the settlement statement to
constitute an executory accord.
Testimony at trial conflicted significantly
as to the contract price. Plaintiff Davies
testified that he and defendant Olson orally
agreed that plaintiff Davies would construct the four duplexes for cost plus
$6,000 builder's profit per duplex. Defendant Olson, on the other hand, while conceding that cost plus $6,000 was discussed,
denied that he agreed to an open-ended
deal. Subsequent to the oral conversation
between plaintiff Davies and defendant Olson, plaintiff Davies prepared a cost breakdown and submitted it to Wasatch Bank
and to defendant Olson. Thereafter, defendant Olson prepared a written contract
with a provision that cost was not to exceed $72,070 per duplex, evidently attempting to appease defendant Lund's concern
about cost Defendant Olson presented
this proposed contract to plaintiff Davies,
claiming Davies said that he would sign it
This contract, however, was never executed.

price as $128,500. At trial, conflicting testimony was introduced regarding whether
defendant Olson ever agreed to this figure.
Defendant Olson testified that he never
agreed to a contract price in excess of
$116,000 per unit. Similarly, defendant
Lund's position is that he signed the settlement statement merely to assist defendant
Olson to acquire long-term financing, but
that the settlement statement did not constitute an acknowledgment of specific
amounts owed to plaintiffs. After reviewing the record, we do not believe the trial
court's finding that the parties did not intend the settlement statement to constitute
an executory accord is clearly erroneous.
II. DUE PROCESS
Defendants contend that they were denied due process of law because the trial
court's May 17, 1985 judgment was based
on quantum meruit, a theory which was
not pled, nor reserved by the trial court
We disagree.

Given the disparity in the testimony regarding the contract price, the trial court's
finding that there was no meeting of the
minds as to the contract price is not clearly
erroneous.

[3-5] A hearing must be prefaced by
timely notice which adequately informs the
parties of the specific issues they must be
prepared to meet. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669
P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983). Issues not
expressly raised in the pleadings, however,
may be tried by the implied consent of the
parties. General Ins. Co. v. Carnicero
Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah
1976). Implied consent may be found
where evidence is introduced without objection. Id Moreover, proof of a quasi-contract under an allegation of a breach of an
express contract does not violate due process, absent surprise or prejudice. North
Tillamook County Sanitary Authority v.
Great American Ins. Co., 46 Or.App. 173,
611 P.2d 319, 321 (1980).

[2] We also affirm the trial court's finding that the settlement statement used for
closing on the financing did not constitute
an "executory accord," because there was
no meeting of the minds. See Golden Key
Realty, Inc. v. Manias, 699 P.2d 780, 783
(Utah 1985); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v.
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369,1372 (Utah 1980).
The settlement statement lists the contract

[6] Quantum meruit was, at least inferentially, an issue at the supplemental
hearing. The supplemental hearing focused on the plans and specifications underlying the cost breakdown and the additional costs plaintiffs incurred because of
defendant Olson's requested changes in the
duplex specifications. There is no showing
that defendants were surprised or prevent-
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ed from presenting all evidence pertaining
to the reasonable costs of construction or
the benefits defendants received, nor that
they were prejudiced by the trial judge
relying on the theory of quantum meruit
Furthermore, any possible prejudice defendants may have suffered is cured by
our remand for a new trial on the issue of
damages.
III. DEFENDANT LUND'S LIABILITY
The trial court, in its final May 17, 1985
judgment, without any supportive findings
or explanation, relieved defendant Lund of
liability. The court did this although it had
previously held him liable for the $23,741.54 judgment. We are unable to ascertain whether the court found that defendant Lund requested plaintiffs to perform
services, and if so, to what extent, or
whether any benefit was conferred upon
defendant Lund by plaintiffs' construction
of the duplexes. If defendant Lund requested services and received a benefit
which would be unjustly retained, he is
liable under quantum meruit1
Consequently, we remand to the trial court for
findings on this issue and an entry of judgment consistent with our opinion.

ages assessed against defendant Olson, the
court gave defendant Olson credit for the
August 4, 1983 judgment—a judgment
based on a theory that the court had rejected. Further, the court did not indicate
whether defendant Lund was still bound by
the earlier judgment entered against him.
By giving defendant Olson credit for the
August 4, 1983 judgment, an earlier judgment which the May 17,1985 judgment, on
its face, seems to supercede, the trial court,
in effect, reduced the amount of plaintiffs'
recovery. The trial court did not indicate
whether it intended the May 17,1985 judgment to be in addition to the August 4,
1983 judgment, or instead of it 1 In light
of these observations, we find that the May
17,1985 judgment is internally inconsistent
and, if enforced, patently unfair to plaintiffs under any interpretation of the evidence. Therefore, we reverse and remand
for a determination of damages under

quantum meruit

[7] In its May 17, 1985 judgment, the
court determined that there was no meeting of the minds as to the plans and specifications underlying the cost breakdown, reversing its prior conclusion. The court,
therefore, premised its May 17, 1985 judgment strictly on quantum meruit Nonetheless, in calculating the measure of dam-

[8] Because we remand for further proceedings, we attempt to provide some guidance to the trial court See Utah Farm
Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 737
P.2d 154, 158 (Utah 1987). Quantum meruit is an action initiated by a plaintiff to
recover payment for labor performed in a
variety of circumstances in which that
plaintiff, for some reason, would not be
able to sue on an express contract Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes
that no enforceable written or oral contract
exists. See Blue Ridge Sewer Improvement Diet v. Lowry A AMOS., Inc., 149
Arii. 873, 718 P.2d 1026 (CtApp.1986).
Confusion surrounds the use and application of quantum meruit, see, e.g., Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th
Cir.1978) (attempting to apply Idaho law);
Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134,
686 P.2d 79 (CtApp.1984), because courts
have used the terms quantum meruit
contract implied in fact, contract implied in
law, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment,
and/or restitution without analytical prech

Sr Of course, the court, on remand, could find
other theories of recovery against defendant
Lund based upon the evidence, including partnership or joint venture.

4. The earlier judgment was not made final pursuant to Utah RXiv.P. 54(b) and therefore
would teem to be legally merged into or superceded by the May 17 final judgment

IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Despite our approval of the trial court's
decision to base recovery on quantum meruit we, nonetheless, reverse the May 17,
1985 judgment because we find that it is
legally and factually inconsistent
In its August 4,1983 judgment, the trial
court based plaintiffs' damages on the cost
breakdown and held both defendants liable.
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•k>n. See, e.g., Buramca Ecosys v. Roediger Pittsburgh, Inc., 681 F.Supp. 415, 422
(E.D.IU.1984) (discussing quasi-contract
claim in quantum meruit litigation); Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737,
710 P.2d 647, 655-57 (CtApp.1985); Sharp
v. Laubersheimer, 847 N.W.2d 268, 270
(Minn.1984); Ellis-Jones, Inc. v. Western
Waterproofing Co., 66 N.CApp. 641, 64647, 812 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1984).
Quantum meruit has two distinct
branches. Both branches, however, are
rooted in "justice," see Lakeshore Fin.
Corp. v. Comstock, 587 F.Supp. 426, 429
(W.D.Mich. 1984), to prevent the defendant's enrichment at the plaintiffs expense.
See Hazelwood Water Dist. v. First Union
Management, Inc., 78 Or.App. 226, 715
P.2d 498 (1986).
[9,10] Contract implied in law, also
known as quasi-contract or unjust enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit
A quasi-contract is not a contract at all, but
rather is a legal action in restitution. See 1
A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 19, at
44, 46 (1963). The elements of a quasi-contract, or a contract implied in law, are: (1)
the defendant received a benefit; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances
that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for
it See Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553,
557 (Utah 1984) (using the term "unjust
enrichment"). The measure of recovery
under quasi-contract, or contract implied in
law, is the value of the benefit conferred on
the defendant (the defendant's gain) and
not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff,
see First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d
683, 687 (Utah 1980), or necessarily the
reasonable value of the plaintiffs services.
[11] A contract implied in fact is the
second branch of quantum meruit
A
contract implied in fact is a "contract" established by conduct See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 5 comment a
(1981). The elements of a contract implied
in fact are: (1) the defendant requested the
plaintiff to perform work; (2) the plaintiff
expected the defendant to compensate him
or her for those services; and (3) the de-

fendant knew or should have known that
the plaintiff expected compensation. See
Kintz v. Read, 28 Wash.App. 731, 626 P.2d
52, 55 (1981); see also Restatement (Second) of Contract* § 5 comment a (1981)
(providing that terms of promise or agreement are those expressed in language of
parties or implied in fact from other conduct); 1 S. Williston, Williston on Contracts § 3, at 8-10 (1957) (defining implied
in fact contracts as obligations arising
from mutual agreement and intent to promise where parties do not express agreement
and promise in words); 1 A. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts § 18 (1963) (noting that implied contracts impose contractive duty by
reason of promissory expression and are no
different than express contracts, although
different in mode of expressing assent).
'Technically, recovery in contract implied
in fact is the amount the parties intended
as the contract price. If that amount is
unexpressed, courts will infer that the parties intended the amount to be the reasonable market value of the plaintiffs services." Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify
Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 Am.U.L.
Rev. 547, 556 (1986).
In the case before us, the trial court
correctly found that there was no express
contract, and thus that plaintiffs' recovery
must be based on quantum meruit The
court further held that plaintiffs should
recover their reasonable costs of constructing the duplexes. The court correctly
found a contract implied in fact. It is
undisputed that defendant Olson orally requested plaintiff Davies to construct the
duplexes, that plaintiffs expected Olson to
compensate them for those services, and
that Olson knew that plaintiffs expected
compensation. Thus, we remand as to defendant Olson for a determination of the
reasonable value of plaintiffs' services in
constructing the duplexes, and an entry of
judgment against him for that amount
We are unable to determine what the
court found as to defendant Lund. Thus
we remand as to defendant Lund for findings on whether he requested plaintiffs to
perform work, and if so, to what extent, or
whether he received any unjust benefits as
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a result of plaintiffs' efforts. These findings will support the court's conclusion as
to whether defendant Lund is liable to
plaintiffs under quantum meruit—* contract implied in law, or quantum meruit
—a contract implied in fact, or neither. As
is explained more fully supra, the measure
of damages may differ depending on the
theory adopted.
V. INTEREST
In awarding damages, the applicable legal rate of interest must also be determined. The 1981 amendment to section
15-1-1 increased the legal rate of interest
from 6 percent to 10 percent Utah Code
Ann. § 15-1-1 (1986).
[12] The statutory legal rate of interest
is applied from the date payment is due to
the judgment date. See Lignell v. Berg,
593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979).
[13] The trial court found July 7, 1981,
the date defendant Lund signed the settlement statement, as the due date, as that
was the date the benefit was conferred. It
was also on this date that defendants acknowledged an obligation to pay plaintiffs
for their services in constructing the duplexes. We find that this determination is
supported by substantial evidence and
therefore will not disturb it on appeal. See
id at 810. Based on this factual determination, we find the appropriate rate of interest is 10 percent
The May 17, 1985 judgment is affirmed
in part and reversed in part The case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party to bear
its own costs.
GARFF, and ORME, JJ., concur.
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though letter from contractor placed in
sealed envelope containing $164,022 bid for
construction of school addition stated that
bid was contingent on certain price being
paid for roof decking material, where letter
was not read as part of bid and contractor
allowed bid to be accepted without calling
attention to such contingency and subsequently entered contract providing for payment of $164,022 for construction of school
addition, contractor was bound to construct
school addition for $164,022 and was not
entitled to recover additional costs of roof
decking.
Reversed.
Maughan, J., filed a dissenting opinion
in which Wilkins, J., concurred.

JAYE SMITH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION, GRANITE
SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 14497.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 26, 1977.
Appeal was taken from a judgment of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., J., entered in favor
of contractor in action to recover costs of
roof decking materials supplied school district under construction contract. The Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that even
7. Priestly v. State, 19 Ariz. 371, 171 P. 137,
note 1; Scrivener v. State, 63 Okl.Cr. 418, 75
P.2d 1154; Stevens v. State, 94 Okl.Cr. 216, 232
P.2d 949.

1. Schools and School Districts *»86(2)
Even though letter from contractor
placed in sealed envelope containing $164,022 bid for construction of school addition
stated that bid was contingent on certain
price being paid for roof decking material,
where letter was not read as part of bid and
contractor allowed bid to be accepted without calling attention to such contingency
and subsequently €gj£ered contract providing for payment of $164,022 for construction of school addition, contractor was
bound to construct school addition for $164,022 and was not entitled to recover additional costs of roof decking.
2. Schools and School Districts *=>80(2)
Bid submitted by contractor for construction of school addition was merely offer to enter into contract; thus, when written construction contract was agreed to and
signed, all prior offers and counteroffers
were merged therein.
3. Evidence «=»448
Where contract for construction of
school addition was clear and unambiguous,
trial court should not have admitted any
8. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, Sec. 267; 160 A.L.R. 753,
767; Cwach v. V. S., 212 F.2d 520 (8th Cir.
1954); People v. Franklin, 56 Cal.App.3d 18,
128 Cal.Rptr. 94 (1976); State v. Persinger, 62
Wash.2d 362, 382 P.2d 497 (1963).
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evidence of what contractor's intentions
were when it made its bid.
4. Schools and School Districts *=>86(2)
Requiring contractor to construct
school addition for amount of agreed to
contract price did not constitute unjust enrichment to school district which learned of
additional cost for roofing material prior to
completion of school addition.
5. Contracts *=>5
There is no unjust enrichment to one
who compels other party to live up to his
agreement.
Ted D. Smith and M. Byron Fisher, of
Fabian & Clendenin, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
ELLETT, Justice:
The appellant requested bids from contractors to build an addition to a junior
high school gymnasium according to plans
ar>4 specifications prepared by an architect.
7 he bids were all submitted in sealed envelopes, and on March 6,1973, at the offices
of the Granite School District, a bid-opening session was conducted to determine the
low bidder pursuant to Section 53-11-1,
l'.^.A.1953, which provides:
. . At the time and place specified in said notice the board shall meet
and publicly open and read all proposals
received, and, if satisfactory bids have
been received, shall award the contract to
th<. lowest responsible bidder.
Thi bids, which were submitted in sealed
envelopes, were opened by Mr. Davidson,
Director of New School Facilities, handed
t«» the architect; and then to Dr. Call, superintendent of the Board of Education.
The envelope of the respondent contained a
litter signed by Mr. Jaye Smith, its president, stating:
Hue to the difficulty in determining
the price and availability of the three
inch roof deck material specified . .,
1 hau submitted my proposal on the ba-

sis of a cost of 36 cents per square foot of
roof area. I use this figure only as a
basis for arriving at a total bid price, and
stipulate a change in contract price, either higher or lower as the information
becomes available.
The letter was not noticed by anyone
present and was not read as a part of the
proposed bid in ascertaining the low bidder.
The bid as made and read was as follows:
Gentlemen:
Having carefully examined the plans,
specifications, all documents and addenda
entitled: "Physical Education Addition,
Kearns Junior High School" Granite
School District at 4040 West 5305 South,
Kearns, Utah as prepared by ARTHUR
K. OLSEN, Architect, 357 East Fifth
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and having
examined the site of the proposed construction, and understanding all governing conditions under which the work is to
be done, the undersigned proposes to furnish all labor, material, services, utilities,
tools, machinery, taxes, insurance and incidentals for the:
BID STRUCTURE:
A. Base Bid—Completion Date August
10, 1973: Sum of One Hundred Sixty
Four Thousand Twenty Two Dollars
($164,022.00).
Completion of Work : If the Undersigned
be notified of the acceptance of this proposal within fifteen days after the date
hereof, he agrees to execute a contract
agreement in the form bound in these
specifications for the above work for the
above stated compensation, and to guarantee completion of all phases of this
work ready for occupancy on or before
August 10, 1973 (See Bid Structure). The
Liquidated Damages Condition of the
"Agreement" form has been considered in
making this proposal and will pertain to
whichever time is selected in the bid
structure.
Bond: The Undersigned agrees, if
awarded the Contract, to furnish and deliver to the Board bonds subject to the
approval of the Board of Education on
the bond forms bound in these specifica-
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tions, each in the amount equal to 100
percent of the contract sum. The proposed surety company is United Pacific
Insurance
The respondent allowed his bid to be read
and accepted by the Board of Education
without calling attention to the fact that
the amount of his bid was not to be the sum
which he expected to receive if his bid price
was the low figure ($164,022.00). Had he
done so, his bid would not have been considered the lowest bid for no one knew
what his ultimate price might be.
The costs of labor and material are always subject to fluctuations, and a contractor who makes a bid takes the risk of a rise
in prices and is entitled to the benefits in
case of a lowering thereof. As a part of
the bid submitted, the respondent made the
following paragraphs:
Agreement: The Undersigned had read
the "Agreement" form thoroughly and
hereby agrees with and has included all
the costs of all provisions contained
therein.
District Bid Depository: The Undersigned has abided by the spirit and the
letter of the "District Bid Depository"
described in the "Addendum to the General Conditions" and "Instructions to Bidders" and the published "Notice to Contractors".
Errors: The Undersigned has checked
carefully all of the above figures and
understands that the Board will not be
responsible for any errors or omissions on
the part of the Undersigned in making
this bid.
Collusion : The Undersigned hereby certifies that this bid is genuine and not
sham or collusive or made in the interest
or in behalf of any person not herein
named, and that the Undersigned has not
in any manner sought by collusion to
secure for himself an advantage over any
other bidder.
Two days later Mr. Smith, president of
the respondent company, met with the representatives of the school board and they
formally signed the contract which provided, among other things,

The Board agrees to pay the Contractor
for the said work and materials and for
the full performance by the Contractor of
all covenants and conditions in the manner and form herein set out for the General Contract, including Plans and Specifications, the sum of One Hundred Sixty
Four Thousand Twenty Two ($164,022.)
dollars subject to additions and deductions as herein provided, and subject to
the provisions of this Agreement.
Nowhere in the contract is there any
mention of a contingency in the amount to
be paid the contractor. Moreover, by plaintiffs own admission, no mention whatsoever of a contingent bid was made during the
meeting in which Mr. Smith signed the
contract.
At trial Mr. Smith testified as follows:
Q. On March 8, 1973, was there any
discussion at that time with Mr. Davidson
as to the contingency in your bid for the
roof decking amount?
A. No, there wasn't.
Q. Did you in fact sign the contract on
March 8th?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you sign that in the amount
of $164,022.00?
A. I signed the contract with that
amount written on it.
It was not until approximately six weeks
later that Mr. Davidson discovered the existence of the letter. This occurred after
Mr. Davidson heard about the possible contingency and checked the bid envelope
where he found the note stashed away
among the papers contained therein.
[1,2] The formal contract signed March
8, 1973, governs the parties hereto; and
even if Mr. Smith had his fingers crossed
when the bids were opened and read, the
signing of the formal contract bound him to
construct the addition to the gymnasium
according to the plans and specifications for
the total sum of $164,022.00, subject to additions and deductions; and there were no
additions or deductions agreed to, save one
$150 item for striping. The bid submitted
was merely an offer to enter into a contact
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and when the written contract was agreed
to and signed, all prior offers and counteroffers were merged therein.1
[3] The contract was clear and unambiguous, and the court should not have permitted any evidence of what the intentions
of plaintiff were when it made its bid. The
material thing is what did the parties intend when they signed the contract? The
answer to that is clear—they intended that
plaintiff construct the building according to
the plans and specifications and for the
defendant to pay the sum of $164,022.00.
[4] In its memorandum decision, the trial court said, "However, before the work
was completed they did learn of the letter,
learned of the extra cost, and to now permit
the defendant to take advantage of plaintiff's position would be inequitable and
would constitute in effect an unjust enrichment to the defendant . . .."
[5] Since when have courts rewritten
contracts in order to enhance the profits of
one of the parties thereto or to prevent loss
to the other? There is no unjust enrichment to one who compels the other party to
\)\L up to his agreement.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed except as to the award of $150 made
for striping. Costs are awarded to the appellant.
HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, J.,
concur.
MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting):
On appeal is a judgment in an action to
recover the cost of certain redwood decking
supplied to defendant under a construction
agreement. At trial, plaintiff was allowed
to amend his complaint to seek recovery of
$150 for extra work performed under the
agreement. Judgment was rendered for
plaintiff. We should affirm, with costs to
plaintiff.
In response to public invitation by defendant, plaintiff submitted a bid for the
alteration of a gymnasium in a junior high
school. The bid for $164,022.00 was sub-

mitted with a letter, hereinafter referred to
as the contingency letter on March 6, 1973.
Plaintiff stated therein:
Due to the difficulty in determining
price and availability of the three inch
roof deck material specified for the Physical Education addition to Keams Junior
High School, I have submitted my proposal on the basis of a cost of 36 cents per
square foot of roof deck area. I use this
figure only as a basis for arriving at a
total bid price, and stipulate a change in
contract price, either higher or lower as
the information becomes available.
The bids were opened by a representative
of defendant. There was a dispute as to
whether the contingency letter was removed at that time; and defendant has
vigorously contended it did not have knowledge of the contents of the contingency
letter, until four to six weeks later. On the
same day, the bids were opened, March 6,
1973, defendant's agent, the Superintendent, recommended plaintiff's bid be accepted; an appropriate motion was made, and
defendant accepted plaintiff's bid. On
March 8, 1973, a memorandum of this contract was executed by the parties.
The evidence adduced at trial indicated
the brand of decking designated, in the
plans and specifications, viz., Weyerhaeuser
Blue Star and Red Star, was not available,
or being manufactured. Consequently, no
accurate determination of price could be
made at the time of bidding. By a letter
dated May 23, 1973, plaintiff informed defendant he had procured the required decking. Plaintiff explained the cost of the
decking was $6,610.98; that he had allocated only $3,008 in the bid, leaving a difference of $3,602.98.
His letter concluded:
If you need further information or
have questions regarding this matter,
please call or write immediately.
Defendant conceded it had knowledge of
the contingency letter approximately six
weeks after the bid was accepted. Defend-

1. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 237.
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ant refused payment of the additional sum
on the ground the written agreement had a
contract price of $164,022.00.
The matter was tried to the court. Plaintiff offered the contingency letter, defendant objected; asserting the parol evidence
rule. The letter was admitted, and the
court granted defendant a continuing objection.

Plaintiff presented his contingency letter
with his bid and proceeded to give defendant notice of the adjustment in price in a
timely manner. Defendant manifested acceptance of plaintiff's offer. It cannot now
negate its assent by asserting it was without knowledge of the terms of the offerwhen such lack of knowledge was the product of its own negligence.

The court found the contingency letter to
be with plaintiffs bid, at the time defendant's representative opened the letter; and
the letter was noticed or should have been
noticed in the exercise of reasonable care.
It was further found the letter was part of
plaintiffs bid, and became part of the contract executed on March 8, 1973. Furthermore, before the work was completed, defendant learned of the letter and the extra
cost. Under such circumstances, it would
have been inequitable, and have constituted
an unjust enrichment if plaintiff were required to bear the cost.
On appeal, defendant contends the court
erred in finding the contingency letter became part of the contract. The ground
asserted is defendant's representatives were
not aware of it; therefore they could not
have asserted to its terms.

A further contention is the court erred in
admitting the contingency letter. This on
the ground it was barred by the parol evidence rule.
The provision in the agreement executed
subsequent to the acceptance of plaintiffs
bid, is cited:
The Board agrees to pay the contractor
for the said work and materials and for
the full performance by the Contractor of
all the covenants and conditions in the
manner and form herein set out for the
General Contract, including Plans and
Specifications, the sum of One Hundred
Sixty Four Thousand Twenty Two ($164,022.) dollars subject to additions and deductions as herein provided, and subject
to the provisions of this Agreement.

Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 70, provides:
One who makes a written offer which
is accepted, or who manifests acceptance
of the terms of a writing which he should
reasonably understand to be an offer or
proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the
writing or of its proper interpretation.
Defendant fails to distinguish between
mutual assent and the manifestation indicating such assent. The latter is what the
law requires.1 If a misunderstanding is
owing to the fault of one party, and the
other party understands the transaction according to the natural meaning of the
words or other acts, both parties are bound
by that meaning.2
1. See Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 20, Comment a.
2. See Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 501, Comment b.

Defendant contends this provision represents the final and complete expression of
the agreement of the parties, viz., an integrated contract, the terms of which may
not be added or varied by prior written
agreements relating thereto.1
Whenever a litigant insists that a writing that is before the court is an integration and asks the application of the parol
evidence rule, the court must determine
as a question of fact whether the parties
did in fact adopt a particular writing or
writings as the final and complete expression of their bargain. In determining
the issue of the completeness of the integration in writing, evidence extrinsic to
the writing itself is admissible. Parol
testimony is admissible to show the cir3. See Restatement, Contracts. Sec. 237.

BAUMGAERTEL v.
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cumstances under which the agreement
was made and the purpose for which the
instrument was executed.4 [Emphasis
supplied]
The court after evaluating all the evidence, concerning the transaction found the
contingency letter to be part of the bid, and
to have become a part of the contract.
It was a question of fact whether the
agreement of March 8, 1973 was an integrated contract, viz., had the parties manifested assent not merely to its provisions,
but as a final statement of the intentions
concerning its substance.5 The question
was found adversely to defendant. There is
substantial evidence in the record to sustain
the finding.
Finally, defendant assigns as error the
permission given to plaintiff allowing
amendment of his complaint during the trial, to recover $150 for striping a floor. This
work was not included in the contract, but
was requested as additional work. Defendant objected to the introduction of evidence
establishing this claim on the ground there
had been no discovery nor had the Board
had the opportunity to look into what work
was done.
The work had been set forth in plaintiff's
answers to defendant's interrogatories.
Plaintiff represented to the court defendant
had promised to pay the sum, but had not.
A letter in evidence, authorized by defendant's agent, stated there was no objection
to the part of the Change Order referring
to this work. The amendment was allowed
on the ground the claim was not a surprise
to defendant.
The relevant provisions of Rule 15(b)
state:
. . If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings,
the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved
4.

Bullfrog Manna, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d
261, 266, 501 P.2d 266 (1972).

5. See Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 228, Comment a
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thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon
the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
The action of the trial court when evaluated by the standards set forth in Rule
15(b), does not indicate an abuse of discretion.*
WILKINS, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice MAUGHAN.
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not provide as to any obligation plaintiff^
exJiusband has to support her. NODMS
ther^any showing as to what the income of
the other individuals in the household is,
nor whether it is or should be "available to
the entire ro>up for their support, care and
maintenance\ and it is not^lear whether
the plaintiff i s \ r is not obligated to share
in the expenses inairre<j4>y others for the
common maintenance
On the basis of whatHms been said above,
it is our conclusion that\he motion to dismiss the comphnnt was nonoroperly granted and thatydiis case shouldNbe remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent
with thi/opinion. No costs awarded.
^LETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
tfS and HALL, JJ., concur.
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Oealon MANN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN WESTERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 15506.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 26, 1978.
Insurance sales agent brought action
against insurer for damages arising out of
alleged wrongful termination of agency relationship between himself and insurer.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., J,, directed verdict
for insurer, and agent appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that: (1)
evidence was insufficient to justify submission to jury issue of whether written contract between parties was orally modified
to conform with insurer's contract with a
partnership so that insurer should be or-

dered to pay commissions to agent accordingly, and (2) evidence was not sufficient to
justify submission to jury issue of whether
insurer terminated its agency contract with
agent in bad faith and thus should respond
in damages for such tortious conduct.
Affirmed.

1. Insurance ^»79
In action on insurance sales agent's
claims for damages arising out of alleged
wrongful termination of agency relationship between himself and insurer, evidence
was insufficient to justify submission to
jury of issue whether written contract between parties was orally modified to conform with insurer's contract with a partnership so that insurer should be ordered to
pay commissions to agent accordingly, since
reasonable jurors could not construe parties'
conversations on their contract as constituting modification of insurer's rights with
respect to termination afforded by parties'
contract given fact that such subject did
not even arise in course of conversations.
2. Contracts *=>324(1)
It is not a general precept of contract
law that, whenever one party to a contract
can show injury flowing from exercise of a
contract right by other, a basis for relief
will be somehow devised by courts.
3. Insurance s=»79
In action on insurance sales agent's
claims for damages arising out of alleged
wrongful termination of agency relationship between himself and insurer, evidence
that operative agency agreement on date of
agency termination provided agency could
be terminated by either party on 30 days'
written notice to other and provided how
premiums paid after termination would be
paid, but did not require that a terminating
party express or have good cause for termination was not sufficient to justify submission to jury of whether insurer terminated
its agency contract with agent in bad faith
and thus should respond in damages for
such tortious conduct.
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4. Contracts ^»5
Recovery in quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract
covering subject matter of litigation.
Robert J. De Bry and Valden P. Livingston, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
F. S. Prince, Jr. and Randy L. Dryer of
Prince, Yeales & Geldzahler, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
Appeal from directed verdict or summary
disposition of claims for damages arising
out of alleged wrongful termination of
agency relationship between appellant and
respondent insurance company. Appellant
asserts three theories of action, tort, breach
of contract, and restitution. We affirm,
and award costs to respondent.
This action grows out of the termination
of a contract under which appellant acted
as an insurance sales agent for respondent,
hereafter American. The written instrument appellant, hereafter Mann, concedes
to be the foundation of the agency relationship provides for termination by either party on thirty days written notice to the other. It further defines Mann's right to participate in premiums paid after termination,
limiting that right to certain renewal premiums. It is not disputed American is paying Mann commissions on renewal premiums as the contract's termination clause
provides.
Throughout the period relevant to this
litigation, American and a partnership
known as "AIM" maintained a "general
agency" relationship under a written contract which provided more generous commissions to AIM than Mann's contract provided for him. Moreover, the AIM contract
did not treat the subject of its termination,
and arguably AIM's right to share in premiums attributable to its sales or the sales of
agents it recruited could not be diminished
by termination or otherwise.
Mann claims (1) American terminated its
agency contract with him in bad faith and

should respond in damages for that tortious
conduct, (2) the written contract between
the parties was orally modified to conform
with the AIM contract, and American
should be ordered to pay commissions to
Mann accordingly, (3) American has been
unjustly enriched at Mann's expense and
should be ordered to disgorge its unconscionable profit under equity doctrines of
restitution.
The evidence shows Mann last signed an
agency contract with American in 1971. In
May of 1973, he became a salaried "Director
of Agencies" for American, but submitted a
formal letter of resignation from that position in September of that year. No written
notice of termination of the 1971 agency
agreement had ever been given as that
agreement contemplates, and Mann resumed sales and agent recruitment activity
for American. He again shared in the premiums attributable to his sales and the
sales of agents recruited by him or by his
recruitees. His status was different from
his presalaried status in the respects that
American provided him an office in consideration for consultant services, and began
to refer to him as a "general agent."
Nevertheless, Mann concedes the 1971 contract survived the Director of Agencies episode, and remained the foundation of the
parties' relationship. The court was not
asked to construct an implied agreement
from the parties' conduct.
The evidence further shows Mann undertook to negotiate an improved agency
agreement, and there were conversations on
the subject between him and American's
then president, Mr. Matheson, in early 1974.
On July 16, 1974, Matheson wrote appellant
the following memorandum:
1. We are amenable to your appointment as a general agent for the Company. If you wish to submit a proposed
agents contract, we would be happy to
review it with you. We could approach
this either on the basis of a non-exclusive,
managing general agent as defined in the
Utah Insurance Code, or as an exclusive,
general agent for us. The commission
scale would depend upon the exact nature
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of our relationship, but in no event would
we exceed a 100 percent commission on
first year business. As a general agent
you would be responsible for all of your
own agency expenses including office
rental, secretarial help, telephone, postage, etc. As to office space, we could
possibly continue to make space available
for you here at a specified rental. Should
you elect to enter into a general agency
relationship with us, we would consider
transferring the agents which you have
recruited directly for the Company to this
date to such agency under your exclusive
control with the agents consent. However, since these agents were recruited
while you were a division manager for
the Company, the maximum commission
schedule in relation to the business produced by said agents would continue at
the present 94 percent maximum.
We are also amenable to continuing our
present relationship with you as a division manager direct with the Company at
a 94 percent commission rate. In consideration for special services in relation to
conservation, product development, and
general agency consultant, we will continue to furnish an office here at no
expense to you. Your continued relationship with the Company under AIM's supervision is, of course, for you to determine with AIM subject to our ultimate
review pursuant to your agents contract
with us.

Q. And who is AIM?
A. American International Marketing.
And he agreed that he would give me a
contract—he could not give me one just
like AIM's because of the conflict with
the 5%. He agreed to give me 100% and
make some concessions for the other 5%.
And that's Item No. 2, which, as it says in
his notes, "concessions to his agency/' he
would advance my agents on submit business and he would advance the managers'
overrides as a concession.
Q. Anything else said during the meeting?
A. Yes. We discussed a 1% office allowance. We talked about the straight commission on my 988 account, and he was
worried about that balance. So was I.
He wanted that worked off.
•
•
•
•
*
*
Q. Anything else said?
A. Yes, He indicated that, for me to
receive a general agent's contract, that I
would have to vacate the office space at
the home office.
•
*
*
•
•
•
Q. Do you remember anything about the
meeting?
A. Only that in his notes he says, "Clealon will consider."

Q. Okay, now, was any conclusion
reached?
A. No.
Q. What was—
A. I said that I would think it over and
Mann made no written response to the
that afternoon I stuck my head in the
memo. His evidence that his agency agreedoor and said, "Frank, we have got a
ment was orally modified to conform with
deal. I will move next door. We can
the AIM contract consists entirely of his
arrange for the rental of the office
following testimony about his conversations
space."
on January 3, 1975, with Mr. Matheson:
In the spring of 1976, new management
Q. Tell the jury what was said by the for American was installed after a stock
acquisition takeover. On August 6, 1976,
parties on that occasion.
A. Mr. Matheson had written down on appellant was given thirty-day notice of
paper a proposed general agent's con- termination of the agency agreement.
tract, starting at 94^ and, based on vol[1] Since the matter was the subject of
ume, working up to 100%. I told Frank directed verdict at the trial level, we are
that w as not acceptable at that time, that obliged to view the evidence in the light
I wanted a contract just like AIM's. most favorable to appellant. To uphold the
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directed verdict, we must first concur that,
even if a jury believed Mann's testimony
and discredited American's, it could not, in
the proper exercise of jury function, find
the parties substituted the AIM contract for
their 1971 agreement as the basis of their
relationship. Reviewing appellant's testimony reproduced above, we cannot conceive
that reasonable jurors could construe the
conversations as reported to constitute a
cancellation or modification of American's
rights, with respect to termination afforded
by the 1971 agreement. The subject did
not even arise in the course of conversation.
A jury could very well find modification
was effected, as to the provisions which
were discussed, but not as to provisions
which were ignored. The nature of an
agent's right to share in premiums after
agency termination is (as this suit demonstrates) an element of major consequence in
agency contracts. The notion that American intended, by Mr. Matheson's statements
as reported, to magnify that right as enormously as Mann's complaint suggests is not
a notion reasonable minds could entertain.
We hold, then, that directed verdict on
Mann's contract claim was properly and
correctly entered.
Mann's next claim is for damages flowing
from American's having terminated the
agency agreement in "bad faith." Here
again, to affirm the trial court, we must
assume a jury would believe Mann's evidence and we must nevertheless concur that
a jury could not make findings to sustain a
verdict. The trial court concluded the 1971
agency agreement was the operative instrument on the date of agency termination,
and we have affirmed. The agreement specifically provides the agency may be terminated by either party on thirty days written
notice to the other and how premiums paid
after termination will be paid. There is no
contractual requirement that a terminating
party express or have good cause for termination.
Mann cites substantial authority for the
proposition that, even though a party to a
contract may have a right to terminate it
without cause, he must nevertheless exercise the right in good faith and not at a

time or in a manner which inflicts unnecessary injury or works unconscionable injustice.
Courts have permitted considerations of
equity to control over clear contract language covering termination where, for example, a dealer franchise agreement was
terminated after the dealer had invested
heavily in showroom facilities and parts inventory (deTreville v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 4th Cir., 439 F.2d 1099), where an
employee was terminated just before a bonus was payable which he had fully earned
except for completing a minimum employment period (Coleman v. Greybar Electric
Co., 5th Cir., 195 F.2d 374), where the
threat of termination was used to discourage the plaintiff and others from asserting
workmen's compensation rights (Frampton
v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297
N.E.2d 425), and with respect to adhesion
contracts. A variety of tort and contract
theories have been contrived to permit recovery in these situations, and the "duty of
good faith" theory which Mann advances is
among them.
[2] Whatever the justification for judicial remaking of the parties' contracts in
these extreme cases may have been, it cannot be adopted as a general precept of
contract law that, whenever one party to a
contract can show injury flowing from the
exercise of a contract right by the other, a
basis for relief will be somehow devised by
the courts.
In this case, the equities in favor of Mann
are hardly overwhelming. The contract under which he operated for some fifteen
years was productive for him. In 1974, he
was invited to prepare and submit the kind
of general agency agreement he wanted,
and he declined to do so. He has not, as a
result of the termination, ceased to share in
premium production attributable to his past
effort; he shares in that production in the
manner his contract expressly contemplated.
In Atkinson v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the U. S., 519 F.2d 1112, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a

MANN v. AMERICAN 1 ESTERN LIFE INS. CO.
CHeatS

fact situation very similar to the one before
us, but where the equities more strongly
favored the terminated insurance agent.
Atkinson's contract was terminated after
13V2 years of operation. Substantial renewal commissions on business he had written
became vested, under his contract, after 15
years. In reversing judgment in Atkinson's
favor, the court held the mere fact of termination when the investment was ninetenths earned would not support a judgment. Here, we have in the record Mann's
full presentation on the issue of bad faith.
It consists entirely of evidence of his satisfactory performance and the lack of good
cause for termination.
[3] This Court has previously demonstrated strong reluctance to rewrite contracts for litigants because the consequences of enforcement of the contracts
they signed seem unfair.1 Nothing about
the circumstances of this case can overcome
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that reluctance. It is unnecessary for us, in
the context of this case, to announce that
the exercise of a contract right in bad faith
is or is not actionable. We merely concur
the evidence in this case was not sufficient
to justify the submission of any bad faith
issue to a jury.
[4] The restitution claim asserted by
Mann is easily put to rest. Recovery in
quasi contract is not available where there
is an express contract covering the subject
matter of the litigation.
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
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1. Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559.
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he District Court's findings,12 but indee
favors those findings.
[81 Finally defendants contend tha£ the
District Court's findings of fact are/inconsistent Vith each other and must be set
aside. Specifically, defendants assert that
findings nok9 and 10 are inconsistent with
other finding^made by the JCourt. These
two findings are two of tnose urged by
defendants themselves ann adopted by the
Court upon defendants/second motion to
amend the findings,\(5ted ante. Findings
nos. 9 and 10 concenAhe issue of prescriptive easement rather than the issue of the
public roadway, and we perceive no tension
between these/md other findings made by
the Court.
The decree of the District Cbprt is affirmed; c/fsts to plaintiffs.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHA! and
HALL, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
r*n

( O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

tion seeking declaratory ruling as to computation and disbursement of royalties. Lessees counterclaimed and cross claimed
against lessors of mineral claims. Lessees
and lessors settled their dispute, and assignee objected to the settlement. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Dean L.
Conder, J., approved the settlement and
dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Assignee
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that: (1) the settlement agreement
made between the lessors and the lessees
was a contract separate and apart from the
original lease, and, therefore, since the
smaller royalty payment which would result
to the assignee as co-owner was contemplated by the terms of the lease, the settlement was not an improper modification of
the lease; (2) the assignee was an incidental
third-party beneficiary of the original
lease, and, therefore, could not maintain
action under it; and (3) the lessors owed no
fiduciary duty to the assignee as cotenant
to make sure that highest royalty payments
were received.
Affirmed.

RIO ALGOM CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
JIMCO LTD., Humeca Exploration Company, Jim L. Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer
as Executrix of the Estate of Daniel H.
Meyer, Eldon J. Card, Norma Hudson,
Jean L. Card, Juanita J. Meyer, N. J.
White, Audrey White, Wilma White,
Otis Dibler, Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace
Davis, and Marlowe C. Smith, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 16032.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 19, 1980.
Assignee of lease of mineral rights who
was also co-owner of such rights filed ac12. That this is the rule of review in equity
cases, see Prow City v. Lambert, Utah, 574

1. Mines and Minerals *»64
Where lessors of mineral claims were
authorized to elect to waive their right to
have royalties determined by external market value of crude uranium, such waiver did
not constitute modification of lease or violation of any rights of assignee of leasehold
who was also owner of one-fourth of mineral claims.
2. Mines and Minerals *=>64
Where paragraph of lease of mineral
claims allowed lessors to elect different
method of calculation of royalties, and, under express terms, once election was made
it was effective for each year thereafter
unless and until expressly revoked, subsequent assignee of leasehold who was also a
P.2d 727 (1978); Maytime Manor, Inc. v. Stok>
ermatic, Inc., Utah, 597 P.2d 866 (1979).
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lessor and who was precluded by lease from
participating in election had no legal right
to challenge either election or refusal to
revoke such election or settlement agreement among royalty participants calling for
permanent election.
3. Mines and Minerals <*=>64
Where lessors of mineral claims made
election pursuant to express settlement
agreement between lessors and lessees as to
how royalties would be divided, agreement
between lessors and lessees which constituted such election was separate contract from
original lease, and, therefore, assignee of
lease had no right to challenge agreement.
4. Corporations <s=»197
Owners of voting corporate stock have
right to vote their stock as they please and
are not obligated to defer to interests of
minority stockholders; majority stockholders are subject only to restriction that they
may not vote their stock for purpose of
oppressing or defrauding minority stockholders.
5. Mines and Minerals *=>$4
Where assignee of lease of mineral
claims had obvious conflict of interest as to
calculation of royalties in that it was also
part owner of original claim and recognition of assignee's power to vote on whether
lessors could make election as to how royalties were to be computed would give veto
power over such choice to assignee, there
was no oppressive or fraudulent conduct in
lessors and lessees assignors ignoring interest of assignee in settling their own dispute
and agreeing to smaller amount of royalty
payments.
6. Contracts <*=>168
Whether expressed or not, every contract includes covenant of good faith with
respect to dealings between the parties;
parties to a contract must deal fairly and
honestly with each other.
7. Contracts «=> 143(3)
A court will not make a better contract
for the parties than they have made for
themselves.

8. Contracts «=»168
An express agreement or covenant relating to a specific contract right excludes
the possibility of an implied covenant of a
different or contradictory nature.
9. Mines and Minerals «=»64
Where assignee of lease of mineral
claims was also part owner of original
claim, lessors who were also owners were
not required to subordinate their own interests to those of assignee in making their
election as to how royalties were to be
determined.
10. Contracts «=»189
Duty of good faith does not mean party
vested with clear right is obligated to exercise that right to its own detriment for the
purpose of benefiting another party to the
contract.
11. Contracts <*=>189
A court will not enforce asserted rights
that are not supported by contract itself.
12. Compromise and Settlement *=>17(2)
Where lessors of mineral claim who had
right to exercise election as to how royalties
were to be calculated waived their right to
revoke royalty election in order to settle
lengthy and costly litigation over disposition of royalty payments, consideration paid
to them for such settlement was not for
interest in mining claims or other property
in which assignee was co-owner with lessor
and there was no evidence of bad faith on
the part of lessor, assignee of lease could
not challenge settlement made between lessor and lessee.
13. Compromise and Settlement *=>8(1)
Where lessors of mineral lease did not
act in bad faith in agreeing to exercise
option as to particular manner in which
royalties were to be computed for purpose
of settling litigation between lessors and
original lessees and such settlement was
approved by trial court, settlement agreement would be upheld.
14. Contract* <*=» 187(1)
Third-party beneficiaries are persons
who are recognized as having enforceable
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right created in them by a contract to
which they are not parties and for which
they give no consideration.
15. Contracts • » 187(1)
For third-party beneficiary to have
right to enforce right, intention of contracting parties to confer separate and distinct
benefit upon third party must be clear;
third-party beneficiary who was incidentally benefited may not recover.
16. Contracts <*=> 187(1)
Where there was no indication in original mineral lease of any intention on part
of lessors and lessees to confer upon subsequent assignee of such lease who was also
co-owner of original claim any right to
control exercise of option by lessors as to
how royalties were to be computed or indeed to have it exercised in favor of assignee^ self interest, assignee was third-party
beneficiary of such agreement and could
not recover.
17. Tenancy in Common <s=>10
In some situations fiduciary relationship may exist between tenants in common,
but mere fact of cotenancy alone does not
create such relationship.
18. Tenancy in Common e=>10
Fiduciary relationship between cotenants is usually found when one cotenant of
real property undertakes to act on behalf of
another cotenant or takes advantage of other cotenants, often in course of acquiring
paramount title or ousting other cotenants.
19. Tenancy in Common <s=>22
Where mineral lease assignee was also
tenant in common owner of one-fourth of
mineral claim and owners' amended lease
with lessees assignors expressly vested royalty election in the owners of the remaining
1. Rio Algom Corporation is a foreign corporation qualified to do business in the State of
Utah. It is a subsidiary of Atlas Alloys, Inc.,
which in turn is a subsidiary of Rio Algom,
Ltd., of Canada
2. The first group of defendants (the "Jimcos")
takes its name from Jimco, Ltd., a limited partnership, which has more than 100 limited partners. Humeca Exploration Company is a partnership whose partners, Jim L. Hudson, Juanita

three-fourths interest and excluded assignee from the election, the owners of the
three-fourths interest owed no fiduciary
duty as tenants in common to the assignee
with respect to the election option.
20. Mines and Minerals *»22
Where amended complaint of assignee
of mineral rights who was also co-owner of
such rights claimed that its contractual
rights and cotenancy status had been violated by agreement between lessors and lessees which resulted in reduced royalty payments to assignee as owner, lessors did not
owe any fiduciary duty to assignee beyond
implied covenant to exercise contractual
rights in good faith, and, therefore, since
election as to how royalties were to be
computed was made in good faith and was
not in violation of any fiduciary duty,
amended complaint was properly dismissed.
James B. Lee and Kent W. Winterholler
of Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Albert J. Col ton and Anthony L. Rampton of Fabian & Clendenin, Clifford Ashton
of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy,
and Clifford D. Vernon, Salt Lake City,
William G. Waldeck, Grand Junction, Colo.,
for defendants and respondents.
STEWART, Justice:
The plaintiff, Rio Algom Corporation
("Rio"),1 brought this action seeking a declaratory ruling as to the proper basis for
computing and disbursing royalties payable
by Rio as a lessee under lease agreements
covering uranium producing properties in
San Juan County, Utah. There are two
groups of defendants: the Jimcos2 and Audreys.3 The Jimcos counterclaimed against
J. Meyer, and Eldon J. Card, are the general
partners of Jimco, Ltd. Norma Hudson, Jean
L. Card, and Juanita Meyer are also members
of the Jimco defendant group.
3. The Audrey defendants are individuals who
participated in the original discovery of the
uranium properties (or the widows of such persons) and who are owners of undivided interests in the mineral claims. This group includes
N. J. White, Audrey White, Wilma White, Otis
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Rio and also cross-claimed against the Audreys. The Audreys cross-claimed against
the Jimcos and counterclaimed against Rio,
alleging breach of contract and seeking
payment of royalties above the amount
which Rio claimed to be due.
This appeal is taken by Rio from a district court order dated August 29, 1978,
which ruled that a settlement agreement
dated July 10, 1978, between the Audreys
and the Jimcos was enforceable as to the
royalty rate to be paid by Rio and that the
agreement did not violate any contract duty
owed to Rio by any of the defendants. The
court dismissed with prejudice all additional
claims by Rio against the Audrey defendants, the claims by the Audrey defendants
against Rio and the Jimcos, and the claims
by the Jimcos against the Audrey defendants. The court ordered Rio to pay to the
Audreys that portion of the royalties to
which the Audreys were entitled under the
Audrey lease and the settlement stipulation.

AUDREYS, Co-ovn«rs of
unpatented Mineral c l a l M ,
(3/4 owner)
RIO (1/4 ovnar)
AMEWDED A D M I T LIA1I [R«adl*eM)
JltfCOS
(Lcaaee)

I

1
RIO-JIHOO ASSICftMBrT ( 8 O M t l a a a tha "Option A g r n — l i t ' 1

RIO
Aaalgoaa of Leasehold
With Roy* lty Obligations
To Jl»coa and Under
the Haadlaaae

!

Pursuant to the assignment of the leasehold interest from the Jimcos, Rio commenced the mining of uranium ore from the
subject properties. Rio contracted to sell to
Duke Power Company the beneficiated
product U3Og, also referred to as uranium
concentrate or "yellowcake."

The present dispute evolved from a potential conflict between the Audrey-Jimco
headlease provisions for alternative methods for computing royalties under that lease
and the royalty provisions in the Jimco-Rio
lease. Basically, two alternative royalty
In 1964 the Audreys leased uranium propformulas for determining the royalty to be
erties to the predecessors in interest of the
paid by the Jimcos (or its assignee) were
Jimcos. This lease was later superseded by
provided under the headlease. The first
a new agreement between the Audreys and
formula was based on the sales price or
the Jimcos (the "Amended Audrey Lease/*
gross value of the product sold or used by
or "headlease") executed July 12, 1968, and
Rio: 8% of the sales price if crude ore were
back-dated to June 1, 1968. Prior to the
sold, or 4% of the gross value of yellowcake
execution of the amended Audrey lease, Rio
if yellowcake were sold. The second formuacquired a V* undivided interest in the subla was based on fair market value of crude
ject properties. In addition, in an agreeore.
ment dated June 3, 1968, the Jimcos grantThe royalty provisions of the Amended
ed to Rio an option to acquire Jimcos' rights
and obligations as a lessee under the Audrey lease are found in Paragraphs 3.1
amended Audrey lease. Rio exercised the and 3.2. Paragraph 3.1 provides:
option June 18, 1968. In so doing Rio be(a) In the event Lessee shall mine or
came not only the lessee of all the properextract ore from the Audrey Group which
ties subject to the Audrey lease, but also
is sold in its raw or crude form Lessee
one of the lessors under the headlease with
shall pay Lessors a royalty equal to eight
a lA undivided royalty interest. As considper cent (8%) of the 'Sales Price' (as hereeration for Jimcos* assignment to Rio, Rio
inafter defined) received by Lessee from
agreed to pay royalties to the Jimcos, in
the sale of all ores mined, produced and
addition to the royalties payable under the
sold in the crude form from the Audrey
amended Audrey lease to the Audreys.
Group .. .
The following diagram illustrates the
(b) In the event Lessee shall mine or
various relationships among the parties:
extract ore from the Audrey Group and
Dibler, Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis, and
Marlowe Smith (who died after the commence-

ment of this action and is survived by his wife,
Adrian).
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recover therefrom for sale or use in commercial quantities any of the minerals
contained in such ore, and if the minerals
so recovered shall be any uranium compound, Lessee shall pay to Lessors a royalty of four per cent (4%) of the 'Gross
Value' of such compounds (as hereinafter
defined). . . .
Paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey agreement
provides the alternative basis for the computation of royalties. That provision allows
the lessors to elect to have royalties computed on the basis of the fair market value
of crude ore, regardless of whether uranium
concentrate or crude ore was sold by Rio.
That provision states:
Irrespective of the provisions set forth in
paragraph 3.1 above, Lessors shall have
the election and option to have royalties
due them under the terms of this Lease
calculated and paid upon the basis of
eight percent (8%) of the fair market
value at the mine portal of crude ore
mined and produced from the Audrey
Group....
Paragraph 3.2, which is critical in this
dispute, also provides for an election by the
lessors under the Audrey lease as to which
royalty formula would be binding. That
paragraph states:
. . . [I]n order to exercise such election
Lessors must unanimously agree and notify Lessee in writing at least ninety (90)
days prior to the commencement of any
calendar year of their election to require
royalties to be calculated and paid in such
manner. After having given such notice,
the election so made shall remain in force
and effect for the next ensuing calendar
year, and from year to year thereafter,
unless the Lessors should unanimously
agree to notify Lessee in writing of their
revocation of said election, which notification must be given at least ninety (90)
days prior to the commencement of a
calendar year and shall become effective
at the commencement of, and remain in
effect during the ensuing calendar year,
and from year to year thereafter, unless
another such notification of election is
given at the time and in the manner as
specified above.

However, because of the assignment by
the Jimcos to Rio, Rio was placed in a
conflict of interest situation with the other
lessors under the Audrey headlease as a
result of its contractual right to receive
one-fourth of the royalties earned under
the Audrey lease and, at the same time, as
a lessee with the obligation to pay the full
amount of the royalties. Under these provisions, Rio's interest was to pay the smallest amount of royalties possible. To deal
with that conflict of interest, Paragraph
21.3 of the amended Audrey lease excluded
Rio from voting in an election for selection
of a royalty formula under the headlease.
Paragraph 21.3 states:
Rio Algom Corporation shall, by reason of
its interest in this Lease as described in
Section II hereof, be excluded from any
vote or decision of the Lessors relating to
royalties and requiring unanimity of the
Lessors, as provided for in Section 3.2
hereof. The unanimous vote or decision
of the remaining Lessors other than Rio
Algom Corporation shall constitute unanimity for the purpose of the said Section
3.2. [Emphasis added.]
The Jimco assignment establishes royalties to be paid by Rio to the Jimcos and sets
payment priorities as between the Audreys
and the Jimcos. The Jimco assignment provides in Paragraph X that if uranium concentrate is sold, Rio, as assignee of that
lease, is to pay "earned royalties" to royalty
interest holders (i.e., the Audreys and Rio
under the Audrey lease, and the Jimcos
under the Jimco agreement) according to a
schedule that provides for payments of between $% and 15% of the average price per
pound of U3O8. Once the dollar amount
thereof has been calculated, Rio is to make
payments according to the following priorities:
(i) first, to satisfy the royalty to the
Lessors in the Head Lease [Audrey
Lease] . . . in its entirety . . .
(ii) second, if a balance of Earned Royalty . . . remains after payment of Lessors* royalties . . . to pay in their entirety
the Overriding Royalties . . .

502

Utah

618 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

(iii) third, // a balance of Earned Royalty .. . remains after payment of the
Lessors* royalties and Overriding Royalties . . . to pay such balance to JIMCO.
(Emphasis added).
The Jimco agreement also establishes a
ceiling based on the sales price of U 3 0 8
which operates to limit Rio's total obligations under the Audrey and Jimco agreements and gives payment priority to the
obligation under the Audrey lease in case
the ceiling is met. If the royalties paid
under the Audrey lease were based on the
value of yellowcake, the Jimcos would be
assured of receiving some royalties; but if
the royalties were based on a percentage of
the ore value and that amount equaled or
exceeded 15% of the yellowcake value, no
royalties would be owed the Jimcos because
of the ceiling provision in the Jimco agreement. As long as the Audreys elected royalty payments based on yellowcake price,
the Jimcos would be assured of receiving
royalties. However, if the Audreys elected
a royalty based on the value of crude ore
and the market value of ore increased substantially, the Jimcos could be entitled to
little or no royalties.
In August J975, the Audrey defendants
elected to change the royalty payment basis
in 1976 from the 4% of the yellowcake value
to 8% of the ore value as permitted by the
headlease. The Audreys asserted that the
basis for calculating the royalty should be
the external fair market value of crude ore,
unrelated to Rio's production and sale of
yellowcake, but the Jimcos claimed that the
royalty basis should be determined by reference to Rio's actual selling price for yellowcake or other uranium products produced
from the subject properties. Royalties
based on a higher external market value
would result in higher payments under the
Audrey lease and reduce the royalties paid
to the Jimcos. The Audreys' election of the
ore value royalty basis thus triggered the
present dispute. If the Audreys' assertion
that the royalties should be based on external market value were found to be correct,
the Audreys stood to receive a substantial
benefit at the Jimcos* expense.

Rio instituted the present action to resolve the question of its royalty obligations
to the two claimant groups. In its complaint Rio alleged it stood willing and able
to make royalty payments to the Audreys
as per the election of the Audreys under the
headlease and to the Jimcos under the assignment of the Jimco lease. Rio paid into
court amounts representing royalty payments owed to the defendants and asked
that the court adjudge the correct basis for
apportioning the payments between the Audreys and the Jimcos.
In July 1978, more than two years after
the commencement of this action and shortly before the matter was scheduled to go to
trial, the Audreys and the Jimcos entered
into a "settlement agreement" contingent
upon court approval. Without determining
whether "fair market value" of the ore
meant sales price or external market value,
the defendants agreed as to how the royalties to which they were entitled would be
distributed as between themselves. The
Audreys in the settlement agreement permanently waived their right to elect under
Paragraph 3.2 of the amended Audrey lease
to have Rio pay royalties based on 8% of the
market value of crude ore. This waiver
foreclosed the possibility of an election of
higher royalties to the Audreys and Rio
under the headlease in the event that a
royalty based on ore value (calculated with
reference to external market value) exceeded a royalty based on the yellowcake price.
The Audreys agreed to make a permanent election of a royalty under the headlease based on 4% of yellowcake sales.
Thus the Audreys were entitled to 3% of
the sales price of UaOg (after reduction of
Rio's one-quarter interest) under the Audrey lease. The Jimcos, in consideration for
the Audreys' waiver of the alternate royalty provision under the headlease, assigned
to the Audreys an additional 2.5% of the
yellowcake sales price due the Jimcos under
the Jimco assignment to Rio. This division
of royalties was to apply retroactively to
those funds on deposit with the court as
well as prospectively for the remainder of
the Audrey lease period. Also, as part of
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the agreement, both parties dismissed all
their claims against each other.
Rio objected to the settlement stipulation
because Rio was precluded by that agreement from the possibility of receiving, as a
co-lessor under the Audrey lease, larger
royalty payments in the form of (1) royalties tied to the external market value of
crude ore, because the Audreys had contractually waived that possible alternative, and
(2) a share of the 2.5% of royalties received
by the Audreys as consideration for their
waiver.
In view of Rio's objections to the settlement stipulation, the agreement was expressly made subject to a court ruling that
Rio was legally precluded from challenging
its implementation and that the stipulation
did not violate any duty owed to Rio by any
of the defendants. A motion was filed
seeking the requisite court ruling. Rio filed
objections to the proposed settlement stipulation and also filed an amended complaint
wherein it asserted that the stipulation constituted, among other things, tortious interference with its contract rights, a breach of
fiduciary duties owed to it, and a violation
of its contract rights. The trial court ruled
in favor of the defendants and approved the
terms of their agreement. Rio's amended
complaint was dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action.
On appeal Rio contends that the Audreys'
waiver of election rights violated Rio's
rights under the amended Audrey lease.
Specifically, the issue is whether the Audrey defendants have the right to enter into
an agreement permanently revoking, for
consideration, the election rights provided
in Paragraph 3.2 of the amended Audrey
4. Rio is entitled to 25% of the royalties paid
pursuant to the Audrey lease ('A of the 4% of
yellowcake sales royalty). However, its percentage is only 15.3% of the Audreys' and
Rio's total royalties, including the additional
2.5% to be paid only to the Audreys by the
Jimcos under the settlement agreement.
5. The claim of modification of the Rio-Jimco
lease is based on that leases embodiment of
the terms of the amended Audrey lease as they
apply to Jimco's tenancy rights and obligations
which were assigned to Rio. It is therefore

lease without violating Rio's contractual
rights. Rio's position is that the settlement
stipulation effects material changes in its
contractual agreements with the Audreys
under the Audrey lease and with the Jimcos
under the Jimco agreement.
Rio acknowledges that the amended Audrey lease expressly excluded Rio from participation in the royalty election decision,
but Rio asserts that the Audreys were
barred from making an election that was
not beneficial to Rio because of an implied
covenant of good faith and an asserted fiduciary duty that one cotenant owes another cotenant. Rio argues that it is harmed
by receiving a smaller proportion of the
total royalties to be received by the Audrey
lessors as a result of the settlement agreement 4 and that this fact constitutes a modification of the Audrey and Jimco leases
without its concurrence.5 Also, the Audreys, by abandoning the position that their
royalties under the headlease should be
based on external fair market value of ore,
have permanently precluded Rio from the
possibility of sharing in the consequences of
that potentially more lucrative formula.*
Rio relies on the general proposition that
the terms of a contract cannot be modified
without the consent of all the parties. Maistrom v. Consolidated Theaters, 4 Utah 2d
181, 290 P.2d 689 (1955), Western Airlines v.
Hollenbeck, 124 Colo. 130, 235 P.2d 792
(1951). The Audreys and the Jimcos, on the
other hand, deny that their agreement constitutes a modification of the leases in question.
[1] To determine whether the Audrey
defendants effected a modification of the
unnecessary' to deal separately with the effect
oi the stipulation on the Jimco lease.
6. Since Rio's contract with Duke Power provided for a yellowcake sales price which the parties contend was below that of the prevailing
market price at the time this dispute arose, a
royalty based on external fair market value
would increase cotenant Rio's royalty share as
lessor/payee and not result in a greater obligation as lessee/payor because of the limit on
maximum royalties payable in the Jimco contract.
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Audrey lease and violated a duty owed to
Rio, we look to the language of the amended Audrey lease as it pertains to royalty
rights. The election option provided in
Paragraph 3.2 is set out in pertinent part
above. The Audreys' right to waive that
election without Rio's concurrence is clearly
authorized by Paragraph 21.3 of the Audrey
lease. That provision states that Rio "shall
be excluded from any vote or decision
of the lessors relating to royalties." Because of the inherent conflict of interest
created by Rio's position as both payor and
payee of royalties, the exclusive right to
exercise the option was conferred on the
Audreys. Rio had no contractual right with
respect to the election process. Accordingly, we view the Audrey-Jimco agreement
simply as a waiver of a right possessed by
the Audreys. That waiver did not constitute a modification of the headlease or a
violation of any rights that Rio had thereunder.
[2] By the Audreys' waiving the option
election and agreeing to accept the yellowcake sales basis for the royalties payable
under the Audrey lease, a new royalty has
not been created.7 One of the choices available to the Audreys-clearly permissible under the terms of the Audrey lease-has been
selected on a permanent basis. Under the
express terms of Paragraph 3.2 an election
once made is effective for each year thereafter unless and until expressly revoked by
the Audrey defendants. A permanent election is no different in effect than an election made pursuant to the lease agreement
without a subsequent revocation. Rio had
no legal right to challenge either such an
election or a refusal to revoke an election.

agreement affects the option election of the
Audrey lease, Rio, by virtue of having
agreed to the exclusion from the decision as
to how royalties should be determined, has
no standing to challenge the Audrey-Jimco
agreement. The Audreys had every right
to exercise that option as they pleased. As
stated in 3 Corbin on Contracts § 564 at 293
(1960), "[WJhere the parties have made an
express contract, the court should not find a
different one by implication' concerning
the same subject matter if the evidence
does not justify [such] an interference
While Rio may receive a smaller royalty
payment under an election made by the
Audrey group, that result is clearly contemplated by the terms of the Audrey lease.
The cotenants still share proportionally in
the royalty payments made pursuant to the
Audrey lease, i.e., 4% of the value of yellowcake is distributed one-fourth (or 1%) to
Rio and three-fourths (or 3%) to the Audreys.
Rio analogizes its "nonvoting" status to
the position of an owner of nonvoting corporate stock, who, though precluded from
voting, retains property interests in the
stock which should be protected by those
who own voting shares. Rio contends it
was illegally deprived of the potential benefits of the annual option being permanently
waived by the Audreys. Rio's position is
that the Audreys were not entitled to sell
that option right without the consent of all
lessors, including Rio.

[3] Nor has Rio any right to challenge
the Audrey-Jimco agreement. The Audreys' agreement with the Jimcos is a contract separate and apart from the Audrey
lease. The Jimcos assigned a benefit they
had under the Rio-Jimco agreement in return for the relinquishment of a contract
right by the Audreys. Even though that

[4,5] The analogy to nonvoting stockholders does not hold. Generally, owners of
voting corporate stock have the right to
vote their stock as they please and are not
obligated to defer to the interests of minority stockholders. Majority stockholders are
subject only to the restriction that they
may not vote their stock for the purpose of
oppressing or defrauding the minority
stockholders. Ritchie v. McGrath, 1 Kan.
App.2d 481, 571 P.2d 17 (1977); 5 Fletcher,

7. The royalties payable by Rio have not been
increased or made subject to a formula different from that provided by the lease. Nor has

Rio's share of royalty payments been altered,
although 2 5% of the royalties due the Jimcos
have been assigned to the Audreys.
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Rio's participating in the augmented
amount as it would do if the larger amount
were paid under the terms of the Audrey
lease, but the settlement agreement had a
valid purpose, and we are not able to conclude that the 2.5% payment to the Audreys
(and excluding Rio) constituted bad faith or
an effort to exclude Rio from its rightful
share of the royalties. Had the Jimcos
agreed to pay a lump sum to the Audreys in
[6-11] Rio contends that the settlement return for the Audreys' agreement to exerstipulation breaches an implied covenant of cise its election in a particular manner, it
good faith. It is fundamental that, wheth- seems even plainer that Rio would not be
er expressed or not, every contract includes entitled to participate in the lump sum.
a covenant of good faith with respect to Yet the two situations are essentially comdealings between the parties. The parties parable.
The clear implication of the election proto a contract must deal fairly and honestly
vision
was that the Audreys had the right
with each other. Fischer v. Johnson, Utah,
525 P.2d 45 (1974); Flying Tiger Line, Inc. to exercise that right in their own self-inv. United States Aircoach, 51 Cal.2d 199, terest. The settlement stipulation does not
331 ?2d 37 (1958); 3 Corbin on Contracts deprive Rio of royalties to which it is enti§ 541 (1960). A court will not, however, tled under the terms of the Audrey lease.
make a better contract for the parties than The Audreys waived their right to revoke
they have made for themselves. J. R. Sim- their royalty election to settle lengthy and
plot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 350 P.2d costly litigation over the disposition of roy211 (1960). An express agreement or cove- alty payments. The consideration paid to
nant relating to a specific contract right them was not for an interest in mining
excludes the possibility of an implied cove- claims or other property in which Rio was a
nant of a different or contradictory nature. co-owner with the Audreys. There is no
Brimmer v. Union Oil Co. of California, 81 evidence of bad faith on the Audreys' part.
F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1936); Hartman Ranch
In settlement of a costly and time-conCo. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 73 suming legal dispute, the Audreys relinP.2d 1163 (1937); 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, quished an option they alone had the right
Conditions, and Restrictions § 12 (1965). to assert in exchange for an assignment of
Because of Rio's dual role, the Audreys a portion of royalties payable to the Jimcos.
were not required to subordinate their own The Audreys had the right to bargain with
interests to Rio's in making their election. respect to their exclusive option, and the
A duty of good faith does not mean that a Jimcos* right to make an assignment of
party vested with a clear right is obligated royalties to the Audreys in return for relinto exercise that right to its own detriment quishing a legal right is beyond dispute.
for the purpose of benefiting another party There is no greater royalty burden placed
to the contract. A court will not enforce upon Rio as lessee. Its payments to the
asserted rights that are not supported by Jimcos are payable only after the Audreys
the contract itself. In re Cohen's Estate, 23 and Rio as cotenants have received the payIll.App.2d 411, 163 N.E.2d 533 (1960).
ments due them. The royalty ceiling
agreed
to in the Jimco lease remains the
[12] It may be true that a royalty based
same.
on the value of yellowcake could result in a
lesser total royalty payment under the
[13] Rio's lA undivided ownership interheadlease and that the 2.5% payment to the est in the mineral claims stands apart from
Audreys under the Jimco agreement would the option election vested in the Audreys.
increase the Audreys* total receipts without The Audreys* agreement to exercise the
Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations
§ 2025 (1976). But there is no oppressive or
fraudulent conduct in the defendant's ignoring the interest of Rio after Rio had
expressly disclaimed the right to vote on a
matter where there was an obvious conflict
of interest and where recognition of the
power to vote would have given a veto
power over the choice of the manner of
determining royalty payments.
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option in a particular manner was for the
purpose of settling litigation between them
and the Jimcos. It is basic that the law
favors settlements of disputes, Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, Utah,
592 P.2d 605 (1979); Williams v. First National Bank of Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582,
30 S.Ct. 441, 54 L.Ed. 625 (1910); and under
the circumstances of this case in which the
approval of the trial court was a necessary
predicate of the settlement, we are not able
to perceive any element of bad faith.
Rio argues further that it is an intended
beneficiary of the election provision of the
amended Audrey lease, even though exercised by others, because it participates in
the outcome of the royalty election, and
that those holding the power of election are
obligated to exercise that power to protect
Rio's interests. Rio cites as authority cases
dealing with the question of the right of
one not a party to an agreement to enforce
rights under that agreement as a third-party beneficiary, viz., Montgomery v. Rief,
Spencer and Dee, 15 Utah 495, 50 P. 623
(1897); Manning v. Wiscombe, 498 F.2d
1311 (10th Cir. 1974); and Hamill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954).
[14-16] However, the argument is not
sound. Third-party beneficiaries are "persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights created in them by a contract to
which they are not parties and for which
they give no consideration," 4 Corbin on
Contracts § 774 at 6 (1960). See Mason v.
Tooele City, 26 Utah 2d 6, 484 P.2d 153
(1971). For a third-party beneficiary to
have a right to enforce a right, the intention of the contracting parties to confer a
separate and distinct benefit upon the third
party must be clear. Clark v. American
Standard, Inc., Utah, 583 P.2d 618 (1978).
A third-party beneficiary who is incidentally benefited may not recover. Montgomery
v. Rief, et al, supra; California Cotton Oil
Corp. v. Rabb, 88 Ariz. 375, 357 P.2d 126
(1960). There is nothing in the Audrey
lease which indicates any intention on the
part of the contracting parties to confer
upon Rio any right to control the exercise
of the option or to have it exercised in favor

of Rio's self-interest; indeed, the contract
evidences the exact opposite intent. Certainly Rio is entitled to no greater rights,
even viewing it as a third-party beneficiary, than it has as an actual party. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 4 Utah
2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955).
Rio also contends that the Audrey defendants, in entering into the settlement
agreement with the Jimcos, breached fiduciary duties owed to Rio. Those duties are
asserted to exist both by reason of the
status of Rio and the Audreys as cotenants
of the subject uranium claims and because
of the effects upon Rio of the exercise of
the Audreys' option election.
[17] In some situations a fiduciary relationship may exist between tenants in common. But the mere fact of cotenancy alone
does not create such a relationship. 4A
Powell on Real Property § 605 at 619 (1979).
In Pure Oil Co. v. Byrnes, 388 111. 26, 57
N.E.2d 356, 361 (1944), the court held that a
fiduciary relationship existed between the
parties, but stated:
A fiduciary relationship did not arise
merely from the fact that appellant and
appellee were tenants in common....
Ordinarily one tenant in common may
deal with a cotenant respecting the common property. Albrecht v. Hunecke, 196
111. 127, 63 N.E. 616, 618. But this court,
in the case just cited, said: "The question
whether there is a fiduciary relation between such parties, so that confidence is
reposed by one in the other, will depend
upon all the facts and circumstances of
the particular case."
[18] A fiduciary relationship between
cotenants is usually found when one cotenant of real property undertakes to act on
behalf of another cotenant or takes advantage of other cotenants, often in the course
of acquiring paramount title or ousting other cotenants. In Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d
377 (10th Cir. 1963), one cotenant agreed to
become the operating agent for others to
"exploit the co-tenancy for their mutual
profit." The court held that the cotenant
with a right to possess the property owed
fiduciary duties to its cotenants not in possession.
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Rio argues that Britton is applicable to
this case, but the facts are distinguishable.
In Britton the court stated:
It is agreed that seller shall have active
charge of the operation of said leasehold
estate, and that said premises shall be
operated to the mutual interest of all
parties hereto as economically as good
business judgment will warrant. It is
further agreed that the parties hereto
will observe the spirit as well as the strict
letter of this contract and work at all
times to the mutual advantage of each
other in the management and operation
and development of said lease. 325 F.2d
at 381 n. 2. [Emphasis added.]
[19] In contrast, recognition of an obligation on the part of the Audrey defendants to exercise their contractual election
right in the best interests of Rio would be
at odds with the purpose for, and intent of,
Paragraph 21.3 of the Audrey lease. That
provision expressly vests the royalty election solely in the Audreys and excludes Rio
from any decision in that election. The
obvious purpose was to prevent, at the
least, conflict, and at the worst, injury to
the Audreys, because of Rio's conflict of
interest. The amended Audrey lease was
not designed to give Rio the best possible of
all worlds which might result from Rio's
status as a recipient of the same royalties
which Rio itself paid, a possibility that existed because Rio paid and received those
royalties in different proportions. The parties foresightedly dealt with this conflict
when the Audrey lease was executed. In
short, we hold that the Audreys owed no

fiduciary duty to Rio with respect to the
election option.
[20] Rio's final argument is that the
trial court erred in dismissing its amended
complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. The amended complaint based its
claims both on Rio's asserted contractual
rights and the cotenancy status of Rio and
the Audreys. Rio argues that the trial
court should have allowed it to conduct
discovery and present evidence on its claims
of breach of fiduciary duties.
Neither the amended Audrey lease nor
the nature of the relationship between Rio
and the Audreys imposed fiduciary duties
upon the Audreys in their dealings with Rio
beyond an implied covenant to exercise
their contractual rights in good faith.
Since the settlement stipulation was not in
violation of Rio's contractual rights or of
any fiduciary duty, the amended complaint
was properly dismissed.
In sum, we affirm the trial court's order
sustaining the validity of the Jimco-Audrey
settlement stipulation.
Costs to Respondents.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
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RULE 41

Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

jtULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF
L LAW 1Y UNITED STATES COURTS
(•\ Aatfcorinto It Amnm Qatsttee* el Lew.
tfftcaiSM Or*r.
\ M Cmmutim Order, S«l
t or Rcjtctioa W
NOr«M
(a) Aattbitiaifcaa la Aaawcr Qaestkras of Lai
The Utah Supreme Court may in its discretion
answer aWiesbcra of Utah law certified to it by a
court of rW limited States when requested/to do so
by such certifying court acting in accordance with
the precisions of this Rule, but only if the state of
the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding before
the certifying, court is uncertain and answering the
certified question will not unduly inter/ere with the
Utah Supreme\ Court's regular functioning or be
inconsistent with the timely and orderly development
of the decisional *aw of the state.
(b) Procedure to W o k e .
Any court referred to in paragraph (a) may
invoke this Rule bi entering an or<Jer of certification
as described in this\ Rule. When invoking this Rule,
the certifying courftmay act either sua sponte or
upon a motion by anHparty.
(e) CertmcarJoa OrdeL
/
(1) A certification order shall be directed to the
Utah Supreme Court ana shall state:
(i) the question of lay to \ft answered;
ifled is a controlling
(ii) that the questk
issue of law in a
pending before the
certifying court; and
$ to be no controlling
(ui) that there a|
Utah law.
forth all facts which
(2) The order shall
ition of the question
are relevant to the
nature of the controcertified and which
versy, the context in
question arose, and
the procedural steps,
the question was
framed
include in the
(3) The certifying/ court may
order any additional reasons ft its entry of the
i apparent.
certification order t^at are not otl
(d) Forai of Certiflcatioa Order, Su|>misakMi or
Record.
A certification order shall be pVepared by the
certifying court/ signed by the judgeXpresiding over
the proceeding/giving rise to the certification order,
and forwarded to the Utah Supreme yourt by the
clerk of the Certifying court under iuW&ciai seal.
The Court, m its discretion, may then Yequire that
certified copies of all or any portion of\ the record
before the ratifying court be filed with this Court
if, in the/opinion of this Court, the record or a
portion thereof may be necessary in determining
whether to accept the certified question or so answering thai question.
(e) Acceptance or RejeclkMi of Certificate*.
Upon filing of the certification order and
mpanring papers with the Clerk, the Court >haH
promptly enter an order either accepting or n
the iuestion certified to it, and the Clerk shall
reuaon serve copies of tins Court's order upon
iifying court and all parties identified in the
tification order. If the Court accepts the questk
for adjudication, the Court will set out in the ort
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if acceptance (i) the specific question or questiori
ted, (ii) those portions of the record wh/th
be copied and filed with the Clerk ofy
CoWt, and (ui) a schedule for the filing of friers
andVor oral argument by the parties. The form of
briefi\and proceedings on oral argument shall thereafter ^be governed by Rules 21 and 40/of these
rules. It\may be presumed that the Coup will give
the matte\expedited treatment.
(OFtea.
The fees fVr filing an order of certification in this
Court shall be\the same as for filing i n d docketing a
notice of appeal in a civil appeal in the Court, and
the cost shall beXequally divided between the parties
to the cause unJe^ otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its oraer of certification.
(g) Aseodetioa of (
Upon acceptance b i the Court of the question of
law presented by the certification order, counsel for
the parties not licensed \ o practice law in the state
of Utah shall associate/smember in good standing
of the Utah State Bar in connection with all further
proceedings before the/Court\
(a) Iasaaace of Optatoa oa Certified Qeestiow.
The Court will issue a written, opinion that will be
published and reported. A copy W the opinion shall
be transmitted Vy the Clerk under the seal of the
Court to the certifying court and 0} the parties identified in the certification order.
TITLE VK JURISDICTION O N WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO COURT OF A P P E A L S
RULE/2. REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS,
AND DECREES OF COURT OF APPE
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a
judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to
"decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
itiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to i
Supreme Court of Utah.
RULE 43. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING
REVIEW OF CERTIORARI
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling
nor wholly measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same
issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in a way
that is in conflict with a decision of this Court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a
lower court as to call for an exercise of this Court's
power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or federal
law which has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court.

For AwotatJoe*, commh COK#CO*B Aaawtsflk* Service
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TKii THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
VIVIAN M. SCUELLER, et al.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Ci\il No. CB3-6862
Judge Dean E. Condor

DIXIE SIX CORPORATION,
Defendant.

oooOooo
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Dean
E. Condor on the 10th day of May, 1985, and was concluded on the
same day.

Plaintiffs were represented by Walter P. Faber, their

attorney of record.

Defendant was represented by Craig G.

Adamson, its attorney of record.

The trial proceeded and each of

the parties produced witnesses, introduced exhibits, and made
argument in support of their various contentions.

The court, at

the conclusion of the testimony, requested that- counsel present
memoranda to the court by May 24, 1985, %* with responsive memoranda
due $n Maj 31, 1985.

Counsel complied with the court's request

anTI the court having now had an opportunity to review the file,
hear the testimony and argument and review the memoranda

submitted by counsel, and being fully informed in the matter now
makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties to this action are the partners in a

Utah Limited Partnership known and identified as D.S.T., Ltd.
Plaintiffs are the limited partners and defendant is the general
partner.
2.

The agreement creating the partnership was signed

on March 3, 1980.

Prior to that time Mrs* Scheller, on behalf of

the limited partners and various of the representatives of the
general partner, had had conversations concerning the formation
of the partnership*

The first such conversation was in the

spring of 1979 between Mrs, Scheller and Hal Larsen.

Thereafter,

Mrs* Scheller and Mr* Larsen met on the site oi the property
finally contributed to the partnership by the limited partners
and discussed the possibility of forming a limited partnership,
Mrs. Scheller and Mr. Larsen discussed possible types and
configurations of buildings which might fit on the land.
Thereafter, Mrs. Scheller met with six of the members of the
defendant and discussed a partnership.

At that time she was

given a copy of an old partnership agreement which Dixie Six had
entered into previously.
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3.

After the conclusion ol the meeting with the Dixie

Six members, Mrs. Schellor took the partnership agreement given
to her by Dixie Six to Janes Arrowsmith, her attorney.
4.

The final aprreement creating the partnership was

drafted by James Arrowsmith, Mrs. Scheller's attorney, at that
time a member of the firm of Watkins & Faber.

Parts of the final

agreement came from the previous Dixie Six partnership document
provided to Mrs. Scheller and the remainder of the agreement was
provided by Mr. Arrowsmith without contact with defendant.
Mr. Arrowsmith made changes in the prior agreement to bring the
final agreement into conformity with the form of such agreements
in use in their office at that time.
5.

A portion of the agreement which was copied from

the previous agreement is the purpose clause, which is found at
Article II of the agreement.

That paragraph states that the

purpose and character of the business is to subdivide, develop
and market certain real property located in Salt Lake County,
Utah.

The terms subdivide, develop and market are not defined in

the partnership agreement^ arKi^frere^*^^^^^
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6.

Paragraph 15.3 of the agreement creating the

partnership was added to the agreement by Mr. Arrowsmith.
3

That

agreement provides in relevant part:
"The limited partners hereby consent
to any sale or other d±.F posi tion, encumber -

anc-e, mortgage or rel^-a se by Dixie on
beh a If Of th<> part;nersh ip of ar'•> or ai i of
the partnerbh ip assets, now or h«ereaft er
acq uired, on such terms and c orid iti ons as

may be determined by Dixie?
7.

During the term of the partnership the general

partner engaged several experts and spent significant amounts of
its own time and advanced its own money in preparing plans, plats
and studies and in gaining governmental approval for the building
of an apartment and commercial complex on the site.
8.

At the time the general partner completed its plans

for improvements for the site during the fall of 1982, it
attempted to find financing to build the project as designed, but
was unable to find financing at a rate which it believed
appropriate in light of the depressed real estate market in the
area during that period of time,
9.

During the period of the partnership the general

partner entered into sales and contracts for sale of the
partnership property as follows:
a.

A sale to Hendrickson in April of 1981;

b.

A sale to Hendrickson in February of 1982;

c.

A proposed sale to P. F. West of all of the

remaining propertj in the partnership in the fall of 1982;
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d.

A sale of all of tho remaining partnership propert>

to Busch Development on June 30, 1983,
10.

The limited partners knew of, consented to and

participated by signing documents for the two sales to
Hendrickson; they were aware of and, through Mrs, wScheller,
specifically consented to the proposed sale to P. F. West, which
was not consummated.

They were aware of the sale to Busch

Development on substantially the same terms as the proposed sale
to P. F. West.

The plaintiffs did not, in any case, object to

the right of the general partner to sell the property of the
partnership.

Plaintiffs' only objection to any of the sales was

with respect to the Busch sale and was an objection to the
division of the proceeds generated by the sale.
11.

In the case of each of the actual sales, the

plaintiffs have accepted the limited partner's share of the funds
generated by the sale and in no case did tho limited partners
challenge the right of the general partner to make sale, even
though they knew that the condition of the property at the time
of each'sale was materially different from the concept of
developed property which plaintiff Scheller said she originally
had in mind for the property in which the plaintiffs urge upon
thus-court.

In each case, the land sold was vacant and no

additional on-site improvements had been added during the term of
the partnership.
5

12.

The agreement of the parties provides that monies

from the sale of the partnership properties is to be divided as
follows:
(1)

Repayment to the general partner of costs as per
billings submitted by the general partner.

(2)

Return of the limited partner's contribution to
the partnership with a value thereof to be calculated at $30,000.00 per useable acre.

(3)

The remainder to be divided equally between the
parties.

The general partner may also receive as i cost a real
estate commission of up to s^x percent (6%) of the sales price of
the partnership property.

The general partner's right to do this

was acknowledged by the plaintiffs in their complaint.

The

general partner has waived its right to the commission on the
sales to Henarickson and has not yet received the sales
commission on the sale to Busch.
13.

From the furid^ generated by sales of the

partnership property, the general partner has received payment of
its actual out-of-pocket costs billed tp date, but has received
no-sales commissions.

The limited partners have received

$7.09,842.04 av a return of their contribution and have received
$205,189.99 toward their --hare of prjfits, for a total of

6

$915,032.03.

The general partner has established a partnership

account in which it has retained $206,050.00.
nothing from that account for

It had withdrawn

payment of real estate commission

or profit at th3 request of plaintiffs* counsel, pending a
decision of this court,
14.

When all of the funds generated by all of the

sales are considered, the property contributed by the plaintiffs
at an agreed upon value of $30,000.00 per acre has been sold,
together with governmental approvals, plats, plans, drawings and
occupancy permits provided by the plaintiffs for the sum of
$1,262,500.00, together with accruing interest on the balance
remaining.
15.

The plats, plans, occupancy permits and other

reports, studies and governmental approvals secured by the
general partners were sold with the land and were at least a part
of the reason for the increase in value of the partnership
property from $30,000.00 per acre to $55,000.00 per acre.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes
and enters the following,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAff
1.

The agreement of the parties does not define the

words subdivide, develop and market and the actions of the
defendant general partner in selling the property as it did does
not violate the agreement of the parties.
7

2.

The provisions of the partnership agreement

regarding payment of the general partner are not inequitable
under the facts of this case.
3.

The plaintiffs have, with full knowledge,

acquiesced, and in fact, approved of the sales of the property by
the general partner in the manner provided for in paragraph 15.3
of the agreement creating the partnership and in direct
contravention of the position which they urge upon the court that
the property could not be sold by the general partner unless it
was developed in a manner which the plaintiffs have failed to
specifically prove.
4.

It would be inequitable to allow the plaintiffs to

accept the fruits of the laborb of the defendant without allowing
the defendant to recover as provided in the contract.
5.

Plaintiffs are estopped by their own actions from

taking the position that the defendant has not performed as
provided in the contract.
6.

The services of the defendant herein have been of

value and it would be inequitable to allow the limited partners
to profit from the efforts of the general partner without
allowing the general partner to profit at the same time.
7.

No evidence has been presented to the court as to

any alternative method of compensating the general partner and

8

the court concludes that the method of compensating the general
partner for its services set forth in the agreement creating the
partnership is equitable and appropriate and should be followed.
DATED this

/ &

nay of June, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

<UDean K, Conder
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER, et al,
J U D G M E N T

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. C83-6862
Judge Dean E. Conder

DIXIE SIX CORPORATION",
Defendant.
oooOooo

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Dean
E. Conder, a judge of the above-entitied court on the 10th day of
May, 19S5, and was eonelOded on the same day.

Plaintiffs were

represented by Walter P. Faber, their attorney of record.
Defendant was represented by Craig G. Adamson, its attorney of
record.

Trial proceeded and the parties each provided testimony,

submitted documents and made argument to the court in support of
their positions.

Counsel for pach of the parties has also

submitted memoranda as requested by the court and the court has
reviewed the memoranda and the file.

The court being fully

acjvi^d in the matter has issued its memorandum opinion and has
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

1

The court now being fully advised and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGhD AND DECRFFD:
1.

The limited partnership between the parties

continues in force under its specific written terms,
2.

The defendant general partner is ordered to

continue to collect and to distribute the funds from the sale of
the property of the partnership as provided in Article IX of the
agreement of the parties with the first monies applied to payment
to general partner for sums due under paragraph 9.2 and 9.3 of
the agreement of the parties*
3.

Plaintiffs' complaint for declaratory judgment is

4.

Defendant is auaided its costs herein.

denied.

DATED this

/ £

day of Juno, 1985.
BY THE COUHT:

Dean ^. render
District Judge
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LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGRKKHKNT

AGRKEHENT made this

_

^ 'lay of October, lt76 f by

and between DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, horaLnafter
<
f//V'.t*/ ^ Scke//e Z
referred to aa •Dixie,* and VI RNON B. CLIrtTON, of the County of

&*/? IxXe

c

t/tfA

sale/A*K

Twi.n Pa 34s, State of Idaho, hereinafter referred to as •eiintori."
WHEREAS, Clinton owrs, free of any lien* or encumbrance?
a tract of land in the .County >f Salt T.afce, State of Utsh, said
tract hereinafter referred to w. \ he "Property,• more particularly
described on Exhibit •A* att«i«*iir»<| horeio and by reference »ade a
part l*ereoi, such ProjMM ty stniM.li' for *nl*Ji vi::ton ami developmentf and
WHEREAS, Dixie has the ex|* nence, personnel*and
equipment necessary for the* f1ev<>1f»ijiiH nt of the Jroporty, and

Sc t*e>//ee
WHEREAS, Dixie and Cl^rrton desire to form a Limited.
Partnership for tie development and sale of the Property according
to |he terms of this Agreement*
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants
herein, the parties agrc* as follows:
*•

Scope and Desrr J** on. The? part JOE hereby create

a Limited Partnership pursuant to the provisions of the statutes
of Utah for the purpose of sut ividi 19, developing, and marketing
the Property. The Limited Par nershtp shall be operated under
Sthe//e£
the name of "Dixie Six and CI* ton* /ith the principal office
A • . 'Z
»i'%w •
thereof at W J 5 H c i f J W S o n t i , Cit ' of Salt Lake, County of
Salt Lake, State cf Utah.
7•

Term.

The Part icn.hip shall commence on the date

hereof and shall continue until the* 31st day of December, 1977, '
and thereafter fr<m year to y sr unless terminated or dissolved
• *«* •«• »•< r #»*•
MPTTAT. W r U H O r**l'l«.iW a UtffMINCMAM

as hereinafter pre vided.
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O^rJbul ions ^uf Partners. Dixie shall be the

General Partner «»f the Limited Partnership and Clinton shall be

stke//*/tr
the l i m i t e d Part; or of t i e P a r t n e r s h i p .
t r i b u t e the Prop r t y to

Clinton a g r e e s t o c o n -

he c a p i t a / o f the Partnership w i t h the

Property being valued for purf>nscs of such c o n t r i b u t i o n a t the
sum of $74$> W«i„:94.

Dixie sh<i1l c o n t r i b u t e i t s e x p e r t i s e for

the purpose of s u b d i v i d i n g , d e v e l o p i n g , and marketing the
Property; s h a l l

>rovide or o b t a i n a l l equipment, machinery and

personnel necessary for such r.uMi v i s i o n , cleveJoj »^nt and marketing
and s h a l l fur!.he

o b t a i n the fiorcr:.s«try find s u f f i c i e n t

financing

for such subclivi :inn, *levolo|*i»rrit .iri<1 m;irk'*rf n«j, using the
Property or. sccu i t y
4.

tlnvcfor.

G nduct_oi P a r t n e r s h i p .

On the date hereof,

Clinton s h a l l convey the Property t o the Partnership by Warranty
Deed.

I t i s understood by the p a r t i e s t h a t the Property nhall

be u t i l i z e d by the Partnership to o b t a i n a l o a n , the proceeds
thereof t o be used for the s u b d i v i s i o n , development and marketing
of the Property by D i x i e .
marketing the P i r a e r t y , the s a l e s p r i c e of the Property s h a l l be
t h e sun of $16,75uvO(T>er a c r e .

The terms- ang^ronditions of

such s a l e s s h a l l generally^jH^yide for^a^poVn payment o f t i n
percent (10%) of the s a l e s pri rc > >K^h/fhe balance, t o g e t h e r with
i n t e r e s t a t the r a t e of eiqb*T >ercent ( H i per annum, t o be paid
a t the r a t e of one perjsent XXX per month of t h e ^ o r i g i n a l o u t standing b a l a n c e ^ i r ^^Tive (5

year period with t h e r e M i n i n g

I aAanp'? due^iTd p. / a b l e at the cm! of such f i v e

Mot

At. W C L L I I

;.r*uif
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Division of Monies R«»roiy3cl.

M l fsonfos received

from the sale of the Property .sh.ill !*• *«llf»cat<HJ *m follows
(a)

First, to thf

KHJ.I]

r*xpon*cs of tho Partner-

ship or D)x:t rclai ivo io the development and improvement of tie Property, s» eh expenses to be itemize*! on
the monthly stat«*mMit p ovided to Chfrttton.
(b)

SoconcJ, to th

return to Ciintcn of liia-

capital contribution in the r.um of $740,f?8.94.
(c)
*•

Third, to Dix o nnd Clinton m*it /illy.

Salaries and Drowi y Account.

paid to any Partner.

Mo drawing

No snlary shall.be

tcrrount *hall be ftntabl iahed

for any Partner unli-Lt; ami until ••!! tiflu.il r*xf*«fi:;c»N of devilop~
stent and improvement have been paid .*tn<!fcliwfcsnhas been returned
his capital contribution*
?•

Management t Duties and restrictions.

During *he

period of the Partnership, the rights and liabilities of Dixie,'

Scrfe//ec

hereinafter referred to as theftcn»>ralPartner and Clfnton,
hereinafter referred to as the L mi tod Partner, shall be ar
follows:
(a)

Ceneral Pnrtt.rr.
(1)

The G e m ral Partner shall obtain the

necessary financing for the subdivision, dexalopaent, and improvement of the Property.
(2)

The G e m ral Partner shall keep all

^a©*
A

financial records of the Partnership at ff
" 5 0 0 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 8 U 2 0 \ Such
<
books ai.d records shall be available for inspection

M< rAV. W a U I N f t , PAUI M M t UOMMtMOMAM

•TM rxoo* rnttwmr. »uit.otN<*
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- A •by «iny J\*irtn«»r at .my liw^. Mrlii inn/illy, ^be
Gcn<»i .il InrtiMT ::ha11 provide to tho Limited
Partner, on .i monthly bar. is, a s tat #»«cnt of
information as to the progress of the Partnership,
(3)

The General Partner shall bc« exclusively

responsible for all functions relative* to the
subdivision, development, and improvement of the
Property inclu'»in«j obtaining all permits and
agroeme .ts roq iirt»d in connection therewith.
Such sultdivi.iion, development, and improvement of
«hr Pre *Tty r.hall ijrn'*r«illy be in accordance
1th the pl.it map ai t .ic-hcvi hereto us Exhibit "B*
nd by reference ma«le a part hereof.
(4)

The General Partner shall be exclusively

responsible for the marketing of the Property.
(b)

Limited Partner.

The Limited Partner shall

not participate in management.

There shall be no

additional limited partners admitted into the Partna
ship without the consent of all partners.

A limited

partner shall not have* the fight to substitute -in
assignee in his place without the written consent of
the General Partner; however, nothing herein shall
prohibit the assignment by cjift or bequest by a
limited partner of all or part of his partnership
interest in the Partnership to any lineal descendant
or spouse.
8.

Dissolution.

The Partnership shall be dissolved

upon the occurrence of any of the following events:

flOf

« •«. •• »•£*'. »r
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- 5 (a)

The sale of ail Property to third parties,

(b)

The withdrawal, bankruptcy, insolvency, or

receivership of thr f>n«»r.*i l\iri.nr»r.
Cc)

Upon, written notice by the M w l t d Partner,

if the General Partner tin IJ fail to pt.rfc •» its
obligations hereunder and .inch failure shall continue
for a period of thirty (10} days after receipt of such
written notice.
In the event of a di •;: r»lnt ion ;is provided hereinabove,
the Partnership Bhnll iimnedi.H #Oy lK»|iti to wind uf» its affairs.
The proceed* from liquidation o

par. n«?rnhip arrets, sfter

payment to al) croditorn of the Partnership in tin* oider of
priority provided by law, :;h<ill be paid and applied

.n accordance

with paragraph five (5) hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, tic parties have cxecu ;ed this
Agreement the day find year firs

above written.

GENERA , PARTNER:
DIXIE

IX CORPORATION

By.
LIMITED WWTNKRs

Vernon B. C l i n t o n

WOTTAT. W l
IP

I A M ©»r.« %... . *
kIMC. PAULVCM * BUHNIMCMAM
•Tflr.iOMAt. »
u*r»m*t*o*

1 4 • UOUTH MAIN Limt

iT

S A L T I ARC C I T Y . U T A H ©4111

1 «>

* • *

i

I.nCAl. DESCRIPTION
K.XHIU1T "A"
BEGINNJ *G at the Southwest Quarter cirner of
Section 22, Township 3 South, Range '. Heat,
Salt l n e Rn«c and Meridian, running North
0 # 08* 8* East 2655.44 foot to the *>st
Quarter corner of Section 22, Township 3 South,
Range 1 Nest, Salt Lake Base mr\6 Meridian,
thence forth 89• 57• 01" Eaat 1320 feet; therzm
South 0* 08' 38" Nest 924 feet; thence North
89* 57' 01" East 612.7A foot; thence South
0 # 07' 35" West 80S.03 feet; thence North
8 9 » 5 2 » 25* West )2.5 feet; thence South
0 # 07* 35* West 584.33 lout; thence Noxth
89 # 51* 22" West 575.70 foot; thence South
0 # 08' 3 1* West 347.?ri ft.i-L; «hf.ncc North
89 # 54' i0" W. r;t 114% ft of to t ho point of
!**<f1nnin |.

MOTTAt. W LLINO. pAtll »UM 6 I'WftNIMCMAM
•TM rwOOM f f t l U N l OUIL «IMT.
« o SOUTH MAIN cT*n r
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH ;41I1

As evidence of good faith Idxie Six Corporation herewith tenders a check in the
aaount of 110,000.00 which w i l l apply to the amount Scheller l a to receive on
the property.

CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
OF
D . S. T., LTD.

Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
Dixie Six Corporation, a Utah corporation, hereinafter r«f#rrad*
to a- " n ) v l c \ VIVIAN M. SC»:r.!'rR# a vonan, .and STEVEN D.
TCLLSTRIP, a man, hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
Limited Partners", and individually by name, have formed a
limited partnership and do hereby certify a,nd state:
ARTICIX I
NAML

The name of the limited partnership is 0, S. T., LTD.
ARTICLE II
PUR:OSE
The purpose and character of the business of the
• tror hip is t

subdivide, develop ind market certain real

property located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
ARTICLE III
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS
The principal office of the partnership shall be at
4394 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah*
The partnership may maintain such other offices and placasof
business as the partners from time to time find necessary or
desirable, either within or without the State of Utah.
ARTICLE IV
NAMES AND RFFIPFNCE OF PARTNERS
The names and residence addressos of each member of
the partnership, general and limited partners being specifically
designated, are as follows:
GENERAL PARTNER:
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION *

4394 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

LIMITED PARTNERS:
.VIVIAN M. SCHELLER
STEVEN D. TCLLSTRUP

3778 East Cliff Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah §4117

-2ARTICLE V
TERM
The term of the partnership shall begin as of the tat*
of the execution of this Partnership Agreement, and shall Oontlnua
until December 31, 1982, and tK~rcaftcr from year to year UnlosS
terminated or dissolved at hereinafter provided.
ARTICLE VI
CONTRTBUTIONC DY PARTNERS
The Limited Partners shall sell to the partnership
the real property more fully described in Exhibit mhm annexed
hereto and made a part herecf, which has an agreed value ot

st*

THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($30,000) per acre. Dixie shall co n -

5i

tribute to the partnership the sum of $10,000, which sum shall be
oai^ to the Limited Partners as a down payment on the property.
* n Addition thereto, Dixie shall contribute its expertise tor the
purpose of subdividing, developing and marketing the property)
shall provide or obtain all equipment, machinery and personnel
necessary for such subdivision, development and marketing; m a
shall obtain the necessary and sufficient financing for su^h
-SubSJvision, development

BT>6 marketing,

vMinp tb* property

##

security therefor.
ARTICLE VII
ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The Limited Partners shall not be obligated to ftmks
Any additional contributions to the partnership.
ARTICLE VIII
RETURN OF CONTRIBUTIONS
8.1. The Limited Partners shall be entitled to
payment for the property upon termination of the
partnership as provided in Article V or upon dissolution
of the partnership as provided herein; provided,
however, the Limited Partners shall not receive payment
for the property until (a) all liaoilities of the
partnership, except liabilities to the General Partner
and Lir.itcu Partners on account of their contribution*
have been paa- or there rerams property of the partnership sufficient to pay therr? (b) the consent of all
partners is had? and (c) the certificate is cancelled
or so amended as to set forth the withdrawal or
reduction.

-3
8.2. Subject to the limitations of paragraph 8.1,
the Limited Partners may rightfully demand payment for the
property (a) on dissolution of the partnership, or (b) on
the date specified in Article V for termination and
dissolution of the partnership.
ARTICLE IX
PROFITS AND BOOKS
9.1. The first accounting period for the partnership
shall be from the date of execution o f this Agreement to
December 31, 1980. Thereafter, the profits and losses of
the partnership shall be computed annually for each period
January 1 through* December 31. Profits and losses shall be
allocated eoually as specified hercinbelow.
9.2. Receipts of the partnership shall be allocated
as follows:
(a) First, to the actual expenses of the
partnership or Dixie relativo to the subdividing,
development, improvement and sale of the property,
such expenses to be itemized on a monthly statement
provided to the Lir'ted Partners.
(b) Second, to payment to the Limited Partners
for the real property.
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder to Dixie
and one-half of the remainder to the Limited Partners.
9.3. In calculating the actual expenses of the partnership or Dixie relative to the subdividing, development,
improvement and aale of the property pursuant to paragraph
9.2(a) hereinabove, Dixie shall not apply any fixed cost or
overhead expenses to the partnership project. Dixie or any
of its affiliates or principals may charge the partnership
a real estate brokerage commission not exceeding six percent
(6%) of the sales price of the property or any portion
thereof.
9.4. %:o salary shall be paid to any Partners. There
will be established an individual drawing account to be
maintained for each Partner, which shall be charged with ell
withdrawals %&de for such Partner's benefit. Ho drawing
account shall be established for the General Partner unless
and until all actual expenses of development and Improvement
have been paid and the Limited Partners have received
payment for the real property.
9.5. An individual capital account shall be maintained
for each Partner and shall be credited with all contributions made by that Partner and charged and credited in
accordance with this paraqraph and with paragraphs 9.1, 9.6
and 9.7 herein.
9.6. As soon as practicable after the close of each
calendar year, but in no event later than three and one-ha11
(3-1/2) months after the close of the calendar year, the
drawing accounts of the Partners shall be closed to the
capital accounts.
9.7. After payment of all debts and expenses of the
partnership, the net cash flow of the partnership may be
distributed to the Partners annually or more frequently,
as determined by the General and Limited Partners. For purposes of this paragraph, not cash' flow shall be deemed
to mean net cash remaining in the partnership's account afte:

-4
payment of all legitimate partnership expenses end withholding a reasonable reserve for contingencies. Such cash
flow shall be coirputed without regard to profits or
losses shown on the partnership's books, except as Such .
profits or losses may affect the reserve for contingencies,
Any such distributions shall be charged against the
Partners' drawing accounts.
9.8. The books of the partnership shall be *altrained
at the principal office of the partnership and shall be
open to reasonable inspection by any partner. Such books
shall be kept on such accountmq basis as the partnership
may determine from time to timu,
ARTICLE X
ATD3TI0i;\L LIMITED PAPTNERS
"

•

•

"

•

"

«'

"

No auuitional limited partners shall be admitted to
the partnership without the unanimous consent of all partners,
both aeneral and limited.
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ARTICLE XII

^V^

PRIORITY OF LIMITED PARTNERS
No Limited Partner shall have priority over any other
Limited Partner either as to contributions to capital or by way
of income.
ARTICLE XIII
DEMAND OP PROPERTY IN RETUPN FOR CONTRIBUTION
Upon termination of the partnership, no general or
limited partner shall have the right to demand and receive property other than cash in return

for it*

contribution.

Upon con~

~^rr*ncf> of all the partners, both general and limited, other
than the partner demanding return of his contribution, the
withdrawing partner may have his contribution returned ih property
other than casft.
ARTICLE XIV
CONDUCT OF PARTNERSHIP
On the date hereof, the Limited Partners shall convey
the property cesenbej in Exhibit "A" to the partnership by
Warranty Deed. The Limited Partners shall cause euch property tc
be graded to meet Salt Lake County standards, end shall cause ell
buildings and personal property located on such property to be
rerroved therefrom.

It is understood by the parties that tho

Property shall be utilized by the partnership to obtain % loan
the proceeds thereof to be used for the subdivision, AevtimNut
and marketing ci the property by Dixie.

MANAGEMFNT
15.1. Subject to the provisions stated in this
Article, Dixie shall exercise complete control in the
management of the partnership and shall devote such tine
to the partnership as shall bo reasonably required for
its welfare and success. Dixie shall obtain the necessary
financing for the subdivision, development and starketing
of the property. Dixie shall proceed with subdividing,
developing and marketing the property as expeditiously
as possible. Dixie shall do no act detrimental to the
best interests of the partnership.
15.2. No Limited Partner shall participate in the
management ^' the partnership business.
15.3. The Limited Partners hereby consent to any sale
or other disposition, encumbrance, mortgage or lease by
Dixie on behalf of the partnership, of any or all of the
partnership assets, now or horcafter acquired, on such terms
and conditions as may be determined by Dixie, and to the
employment, when and if required, of such brokers, agents
and attorneys as Dixie may determine, notwithstanding that
any party hereto iray have an interest therein? provided,
however, in the event Dixie proposes to sell the property to
any entity controlled by Dixie or in which Dixie or any of
its principals own an interest, the sale price for the
property shall be determined as follows:
Dixie shall appoint an appraiser, the Limited
Partners shall appoint an appraiser, end the two
appraisers thus appointed shall appoint a third
appraiser. The three appraisers thus determined
shall thereupon appraise the partnership property.
An appraisal agreed to by at least two of the
three appraisers shall be controlling.
ARTICLE XVI
DFPOriTS
All funds of the partnership shall be deposited in its
name in such checking account or accounts designated by Dixie*
All withdrawals therefrom shall be made upon checks signed by the
authorized officers of Dixie.
ARTICLE XVII
CONVEYANCES
Any deed, bill of sale, mortgage, lease, contract of
sale or other document purporting to convey or encumber the interest cf the partnership in all or any portion of any real or person
property at any time held in its name, may be signed by Dixie.
ARTICLE XVIII
DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP
Tne partnership shall be dissolved upon the occurrence
of any of the following events:
(a)

The sale of all property to third parties.

-6(b) The bankruptcy, insolvency, receivership or
involuntary dissolution of Dixie.
(c) Upon written notice by the Limited Partners, if
Dixie shall fail to perform its obligations hereunder and
such failure shall continue for a period of thirty (H>)
d y s after "ceeipt of such written notice.
In the event of a dissolution as.provided hereinabove,
the partnership shall immediately begin to wind up**lts affairs.
The proceeds from liquidation of partnership assets, after payment
to all creditors of the partnership in the.order of priority
provided by law, shall be paid and applied in accordance with
Article IX hereinabove.
ARTICLE XIX
GOVERNING LAW
This agreement and the rights of the parties hereunder
shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws in the State of
Utah.
ARTICLE XX
LIMITED LIABILITY
The liability of the Limited Partners shall be limited
to contributions made to the partnership.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have hereunto
s e t t h e i r hands t h i s

f? *

day of

/VM/fC//

GENERAL PARTNER!
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION

, 1980.

